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Integrated Reliability Assessment of 
Water Distribution Networks 
Azhar Uddin Mohammed 
The condition of current water infrastructure in North America is alarming due to 
deterioration of old water mains indicating the incompetence of existing water distribution 
to cope with increasing demands. ASCE (2013) report card graded the drinking water 
networks a score of D, representing “poor condition”. In contrast, the Canadian drinking 
water infrastructure scored better, indicating “Good: adequate for now”. Despite this, 
15.4% of the water distributions are graded “fair” to “very poor” with a replacement value 
of CAD 25.9 billion. Delaying the investment can result in degrading water service, 
increasing service disruptions, and increasing expenditures for emergency repairs. Taking 
into account the deterioration severity and investment gap, water utilities need an asset 
management tool that can effectively prioritize the rehabilitation works. 
This research is aiming at developing an integrated reliability assessment model 
that can identify the crucial water main segments and prioritize their renewal at all 
hierarchical levels of the network. In this regard, the proposed research framework 
encompasses modeling aspects of mechanical and hydraulic condition of a WDN. The first 
model analyzes the mechanical condition of a WDN at the component, segment and 
network levels. This model utilizes reliability theory for assessing component and segment 
reliabilities, whereas minimum cut set approach is pursued for assessing mechanical 
reliability of a network. To facilitate this tedious process, it has been coded in MATLAB 
R2013b programming environment along with the utilization of Wolfram Mathematica 
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10.2 and Microsoft Excel 2013. The second model analyzes the hydraulic performance of 
a WDN in terms of hydraulic reliability. It involves the hydraulic simulation of a WDN in 
normal and failure conditions, which aid in obtaining the required as well as actual pressure 
head at demand nodes. The model is then formulated with pressure conditions to evaluate 
the available demand at demand nodes which in contrast to the required demand aids in 
predicting the hydraulic reliability of the network. Finally, an integrated reliability 
assessment model is presented to conclude the research methodology by determining the 
overall sub-network reliability. 
The developed methodology is worked out on two case studies from the cities of 
London, Ontario and Doha, Qatar. Also, it is implemented on two different sub-networks 
from the City of London (north phase and south phase) for drawing comparisons, which 
concluded that the mechanical reliability of a network encompassed by newer components 
with less number of failures is greater than that of other networks. Additionally, the results 
of model implementation revealed that structure/configuration of the network also played 
an important role in affecting the overall network reliability. It was found 0.82 for the north 
phase sub-network and 0.84 for the south phase indicating that the south phase sub-network 
is more reliable. Therefore, the north phase sub-network takes the priority when scheduling 
the rehabilitation. The resulting reliability indices of a WDN, helps the municipalities to 
effectively prioritize the rehabilitation works at respective hierarchical levels. Moreover, 
the outcomes of this research also aid in identifying the most critical water main segments 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are the vital part of civil infrastructure whose 
main task is to provide consumers with a minimum acceptable level of water supply at all 
times under a range of operating conditions. Many developed countries spend billions of 
dollars every year to repair, upgrade and expand the water infrastructure to ensure its safety 
and the needs of a growing population and economy. According to Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United States (FAO, 2013), the total water use per capita in Canada is 
1,150 gal/inhab/day, whereas in United States, that number reaches 1,146 gal/inhab/day. 
Also, the population in North America continues to grow with Canada showing a trend of 
4.6% growth, and the United States recording 3.9% (SOTWI, 2013). However, the 
condition of current water infrastructure in North America is alarming due to deterioration 
severity of age old water mains. Some of them date back to the Civil War era with many 
cities possessing more than 100 years old water mains (Mohamed & Zayed, 2013), 
indicating the incompetence of existing distribution networks to cope with increasing water 
demand. 
ASCE (2013) graded the drinking water networks in the United States with a score 
of D, designating “Poor” condition. AWWA (2012) found that restoring one million miles 
of existing potable water pipe networks as they reach the end of their useful lives, and 
expanding them to serve a growing population will cost at least $1 trillion over the next 25 
years. By contrast, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2013), which do not factor 
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population growth, estimated that $384 billion will be needed to upgrade US drinking water 
infrastructure by 2030. In comparison, Canadian drinking water infrastructure fares better 
than the United States and is graded “Good: adequate for now” in the CIR (2012). 
Nevertheless, 15.4% of water distribution systems in Canada were ranked “fair” to “very 
poor” with a replacement cost of CAD 25.9 billion (CIR, 2012). 
Aging infrastructure is a concern for all developed countries. The random leaks and 
breaks in the distribution system, resulting from deterioration, can cause flooding, service 
interruptions, loss of water, and water contamination and, thus, reduce the reliability of the 
system (Piratla & Ariaratnam, 2011). Water and wastewater infrastructure in the United 
States needs an investment of $126 billion by 2020 to reach a grade of B. However the 
estimated funding is only $42 billion indicating an investment gap of $84 billion (ASCE, 
2013). Whether acknowledged or not, these costs will continue to grow as infrastructure 
ages and deteriorates. Delaying the investment can result in degrading water service, 
increasing water service disruptions, and increasing expenditures for emergency repairs. 
The deterioration severity and the increasing demand of water make the task of 
water infrastructure maintenance a crucial public health issue, as the deteriorated pipes can 
get cracked making the water contaminated. Cognizant of constrained budget allocation, a 
comprehensive reliability assessment should be performed to identify the most critical and 
failure prone water mains and prioritize their renewal/rehabilitation. The evaluation of 
reliability should address all types of issues including hydraulic failures and not just be 
limited to the structural aspects of the network. Accordingly, the reliability assessment 
should extend to all levels of a water distribution, from components to segments, segments 
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to sub-networks, and ultimately the entire network. Water utilities need to develop proper 
asset management tools in order to enhance the current performance of the network, assist 
in the optimum maintenance, repair and rehabilitation planning, and eliminate budget 
mismanagement. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The need of asset management tool that can effectively prioritize the 
renewal/rehabilitation of deteriorating water mains under constrained budgets established 
the core purpose for this thesis. In pursuit of achieving this, certain limitations have been 
identified which require improvement. Although there were many attempts to assess 
reliability of WDNs, these techniques were mostly applicable to individual pipes that do 
not examine the condition of other components forming a water main from the perspective 
of a segment. Moreover, the reliability of network was evaluated ignoring the importance 
of crucial water main connections. 
Another deficiency lies in the fact that mechanical and hydraulic failures are often 
studied independently even though the flow of water inside the pipe has an effect upon its 
condition. Also, the hydraulic performance of the network have been evaluated usually 
ignoring the effect of pressure on demands. And those found to be pressure driven, were 
analyzed manually rather than analyzing in a simulating environment. Finally, automation 




1.3 Research Objectives 
Appertaining to the above stated problem and the limitations identified in current 
approaches, the main objective of this research is to develop a comprehensive reliability 
assessment model that can identify the crucial water mains and prioritize their renewal. 
This model should examine the condition of a water distribution network at all hierarchical 
levels, and consider the interrelation between mechanical and hydraulic aspects. In this 
context, the following sub-objectives are defined: 
1) Identify and study the factors that impact mechanical and hydraulic reliability of 
water networks at various hierarchical levels, i.e. components, segments and 
ultimately networks. 
2) Develop mechanical and hydraulic models to assess network reliability. 
3) Develop an integrated reliability assessment model for water distribution network 
considering mechanical and hydraulic aspects. 
4) Semi-Automate the developed model using coded scripts. 
1.4 Research Framework Overview 
The main purpose of this research is to develop an integrated reliability assessment 
model that can identify the crucial water main segments and prioritize their renewal at all 
hierarchical levels of the network. In this context, the proposed research framework is 


































Figure 1-1: Research Framework Overview 
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1. Literature Review: An extensive literature review is performed primarily focusing 
on the current state of the art for reliability assessment modeling and identifying 
the limitations in the existing techniques. Concerning this, the failure rate of 
components, their failure probability distribution, and the causes of failure are 
studied. The literature also reviews the network analysis techniques to select the 
most suitable method for achieving the objective of identifying crucial segments. 
2. Model Development: The developed methodology encompasses the modeling 
aspects of mechanical reliability, hydraulic reliability, and integrated reliability 
assessment. 
a. Mechanical Reliability Model: It deals with analyzing the structural 
performance of a WDN and its components. It commences by assessing the 
mechanical reliability at component level which consists of accessories 
(Valves, Hydrants etc.) and individual pipes. These component reliabilities are 
integrated leading to the assessment of segment reliability which is a weighted 
composition of components. Subsequently, network analysis is performed to 
finally ending the model with assessing the mechanical reliability of the 
network. 
b. Hydraulic Reliability Model: It deals with analyzing the hydraulic condition of 
a WDN. It involves the hydraulic simulation of a WDN in normal and failure 
conditions, which aid in obtaining the required as well as actual pressure head 
at demand nodes. The model is then formulated with pressure conditions to 
evaluate the available demand at demand nodes which in contrast to the 
required demand aids in predicting the hydraulic reliability of the network. 
7 
 
c. Integrated Reliability Model: It addresses the main objective of developing an 
integrated model accounting for structural as well as hydraulic aspects of the 
network. The product of this model represents the overall condition of a water 
distribution network in terms of reliability. 
3. Data Collection: Data is collected from four sources: (a) Literature, (b) 
Geodatabases for the City of London and Doha, (c) Best practice guides, and (d) 
Bentley WaterCAD library. All these four sources contribute towards the structure 
and development of the research framework. Literature review aids in segmentation 
of WDN components, whereas best practice guides reveals their failure causes and 
provides information about hydrant demands. Engineering library of WaterCAD 
possesses the industry standard protocols of nodal demand allocation, and 
Geodatabase contains the network attributes. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis encompasses 6 chapters. The literature review is presented in chapter 2. It 
covers the topics of failure probability models, failure causes, reliability classification, 
reliability assessment methods and network analysis techniques. The listed topics are 
reviewed with a focus on how they reflect upon the developed models. Summary of the 
limitations in existing methods are presented at the end of this chapter. Chapter 3 describes 
the developed research methodology presenting each proposed model in detail. Chapter 4 
presents the sources of data collection that are used in order to develop the proposed 
methodology and later aid in model implementation. In chapter 6, two case studies are 
worked out to demonstrate the exploitation of developed methodology in achieving stated 
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objectives. Chapter 6 highlights the contributions and limitations of the developments made 
in the thesis along with suggested future enhancement and research extension.
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CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the literature review is primarily focusing on revealing the current 
state of the art for reliability assessment modeling and identifying existing limitations as 
well. Figure 2.1 portrays different areas of literature in an attempt to summarize the extent 




Failure Rate of 
Components





























Figure 2-1: Literature Review Diagram 
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Chapter 2 starts with a brief description of water distribution networks (WDNs) and 
their components with emphasis on the segmentation of WDN and its importance in 
reliability assessment. Subsequently, failure patterns of WDN components are discussed 
along with their reported causes and consequences. The estimation of probability of failure 
for WDN is thoroughly examined with focus on Normal, Exponential and Weibull 
distribution models. The different definitions of reliability are summarized and afterwards 
reliability assessment methods are classified based on failure types of WDN. The impact 
of WDN size on performing reliability analysis is illustrated by underlining previous 
research efforts to circumvent the negative effect of such factor on the computational time. 
The chapter concludes with a summary for the reviewed literature and also identifies which 
limitations will be circumvented in this research. 
2.2 Water Distribution Network 
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are complex interconnected networks 
consisting of sources, pipes, and other hydraulic control elements such as pumps, valves, 
regulators, tanks etc., that require extensive planning and maintenance to ensure good 
quality water is delivered to all customers (Shinstine et al., 2002). These networks are often 
described in terms of a graph, with links representing the pipes, and nodes representing 
connections between pipes, hydraulic control elements, consumers, and sources (Ostfeld 
et al., 2002). They are vital part of urban infrastructure and require high investment, 









Figure 2-2: Typical Water Distribution Network 
2.2.1 Water Distribution Network Components 
Although there are several components, the main components which make a water 
distribution network are pipes, and accessories such as valves and hydrants. All network 
components other than pipelines are termed as accessories. 
Failure of any of these components affects the performance of the network as a 
whole. Water utilities face unprecedented challenges because of failure of these 
components which results from aging infrastructure, tighter water quality and 
environmental regulations, and declining maintenance budgets (Rogers & Grigg, 2006). 
While utilities constantly monitor major components such as pumps and storage tanks, 
other components (pipes, joints, valves, and so on) have more chance of unplanned failure 
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(Perelman & Amin, 2014). Hence water utilities should monitor and maintain the condition 
of these components for adequate supply of water under a range of operating conditions. 
2.2.2 Segmentation 
The working conditions of a water distribution network are defined by taking into 
account the temporary unavailability of some components resulting from failures (Ciaponi 
et al., 2012). Researchers perform the condition assessment of a WDN by assuming that 
each pipe can be isolated (for maintenance and repair) by using valves located at its 
extremities. But in practice, this is not the case because for economic reasons, the valves 
are not necessarily located at the end of each pipe. For this reason, (Walski, 1993) 
suggested using an approach involving “segments” of a distribution system (instead of 
pipes), which can be isolated with valves and are considered the basic unit for assessing 
reliability. 
According to Australian National Audit Office (2010), an Asset Portfolio should 
be segmented into largest groupings that allow worthwhile analysis to determine the 
effectiveness and efficiency of assets in supporting the delivery of specified service 
outcomes. (Walski, 1993) defined a segment as a pipe or a collection of pipes. Some 
authors (Giustolisi & Savic, 2010; Jun & Loganathan, 2007; Kao & Li, 2007) proposed 
methods for segmentation that will be isolated once certain valves have been closed. These 
authors also focused on identification of unintended isolation of a network disconnected 
from water source(s) as the secondary effect of segment isolation. (Salman, 2011) defined 
the segment as a single water main pipe or a group of connected pipes (along with all the 
associated components) which is located between the two nearest intersections at which 
13 
 
isolation valves exist and the operation of these valves leads to the isolation of the segment 
in case of breakage or for regular maintenance of a component in the segment. 
In this thesis, Salman’s (2011) definition of segment have been adopted but with a 
slight modification. Because this work deals with analyzing a network based on 
connectivity, a segment is defined as a water main pipe or a group of connected pipes 
(along with all the associated components) which is located between two nearest 






Figure 2-3: Segment 
2.3 Failure Rate of Components 
Failures are of a stochastic nature and are the result of unpredictable events that 
occur in the system itself and/or at its surrounding environment (Ostfeld, 2004). Failures 
of pipes and accessories in water distribution networks lead to financial and capital losses 
for repair and restoration of the network. They reduce the reliability of WDN due to 
lowering of the pressure or due to interruption of the water supply in parts of the 
distribution network, which ultimately leads to dissatisfaction of customers (Tabesh et al., 
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2009). The component failures in a WDN include pipe breaks, pump failures, valve 
failures, storage malfunctions, etc. (Su et al., 1987). 
2.3.1 Types of Failure 
According to Farmani et al. (2005), WDN deals with two types of failure. (1) 
Mechanical failure, which usually refers to failures of network components, such as pipe 
breakage or pump being out of service (2) Hydraulic failure, which refers to uncertainties, 
such as in nodal demand, pipe roughness, and reservoir and tank levels. More often than 
not, hydraulic failures are a result of mechanical failure in network components. A leakage 
in a pipeline due to pipe break, triggers the variation in pressure at demand nodes, and this 
variation highly affects the encompassing pipeline operations, and the whole network to a 
certain extent. Population growth and climate are known to affect water demand, but the 
relationship between them is uncertain (Farmani et al., 2005). 
Possible causes for mechanical failure include external or internal loading, climatic 
conditions, natural disasters, freezing, aging process, corrosion, and permeation (Tabesh, 
1998). Hydraulic failure may happen when demand exceeds the flow capacity of the system 
(e.g., fire-flow situations). In this instance, high demand in some nodes may undermine the 
hydraulic integrity of the entire system. Maintenance activities, tuberculation, and 
improper operational control can also threaten the hydraulic integrity of a WDN (Gheisi & 
Naser, 2014b). Table 2-1 summarizes few possible causes and consequences of mechanical 
and hydraulic failures. 
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Mechanical  Corrosion 
 Permeation 
 Too high internal water 
pressure or surges  
 Shifting earth 
 Exposure to UV light 
 Stress from overburden 
 Temperature fluctuations, 
freezing 
 Natural disasters 
 Failure due to aging and 
weathering 
 Contamination of Mains, Fittings, 
and Appurtenances 
 Contamination of Storage Facilities 
 Contamination Due to the Absence 
or Operational Failure of Backflow 
Prevention Devices 
Hydraulic  Pipe Deterioration 
 Pressure Transients and 
Changes in Flow Regime 
 Hydraulic Changes 
during Maintenance and 
Emergencies 
 Tuberculation and Scale 
 Inadequate Operational 
Control 
 External Contamination 
 Sedimentation 
 Reduction in Hydraulic Capacity 
and Associated Increase in 
Pumping Costs 
 Poor Water Quality from Sediment 
Suspension and Removal of Scales 
2.3.2 Failure Rate Curve 
The shape of a failure rate curve is often referred to as a bathtub curve for self-




Figure 2-4: Failure Rate Curve (Billinton & Allan, 1983)  
Phase (I) is known by various names, such as infant mortality or the de-bugging 
phase. Failure rate (λ) is very high in this region due to manufacturing errors or improper 
design. Phase (II) follows a constant failure rate because in this region, failures occur 
purely by chance. Phase (III) represents the wear-out or fatigue phase, and is characterized 
by a rapidly increasing failure rate with time. Phase (II) is considered as the useful life, to 
which the negative exponential distribution is applicable (Billinton & Allan, 1983). 
Failure rate for a component in a WDN may be calculated by adopting the equation 






              (2-1) 
Where: 
λ = Failure rate of a component, 
K = Number of failures during the test interval, 
T = Total test time 
2.4 Probability of Failure 
All the components of a WDN such as pipes, valves and hydrants do not fail on the 
same operating time but fails at random times. Consequently, these times to failure obey a 
probability distribution which may, or may not, be known and which describes the 
probability that a given component fails within a certain specified time. This probability 
value is a function of time that is specified or considered. 
There are two main types of probability distributions – discrete and continuous. 
Discrete distributions represent random variables that can assume only certain discrete or 
countable number of values. Binomial distribution and Poisson distribution are the two 
most common discrete probability distributions. Continuous distributions represent 
random variables that can assume an infinite number of values, although within a finite 




2.4.1 Normal (or Gaussian) Distribution 
Normal probability distribution is probably the most important and widely used 
distribution in the field of statistics and probability. Although having some important 
applications in reliability evaluation, it is of less significance than other distributions 
(Billinton & Allan, 1983). The precise shape and position of the distribution function can 
be specified solely in terms of mean value and standard deviation. The shape of normal 
distribution function is often referred as ‘bell curve’ because of its curved flaring shape 
(Weisstein, 2002). 
 
Figure 2-5: Normal Distribution Function 
The normal distribution of data related to component life can be expressed by the 









2σ2             (2-2) 
Where: 
t = time, 
µ = mean/location parameter, 
σ = standard deviation/scale parameter 
Generally, probability of failure in normal distribution is computed by using 
standard tables, which specify the areas under a curve for a large range of possible limits. 
A standard score value (z) which can be evaluated using equation 2-3, is required to 





             (2-3) 
2.4.2 Exponential Distribution 
The exponential distribution is the most widely known and used distribution in 
reliability evaluation of systems (Shinstine et al. 2002; Salman A. 2011; Mohammed et al. 
2015). It is applicable only to the useful life or normal operating period of a component, 
where the failure rate is constant (Billinton & Allan, 1983). 
The exponential distribution function can model the data related to component life 
by equation 2-4: 
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f(t) = λe−λt             (2-4) 
Where: 
λ = failure rate, 
t = time 
 
Figure 2-6: Exponential Distribution Function  
(Billinton & Allan, 1983) 
From this model, the cumulative distribution function i.e. the probability of failure 
Q(t) can be defined equation 2-5 as: 




Figure 2-7: Cumulative Probability Distribution  
(Billinton & Allan, 1983) 
2.4.3 Weibull Distribution 
The Weibull distribution is used extensively in life studies for engineering 
components. It was developed by a Swedish engineer Waloddi Weibull (1887-1979), who 














            (t ≥ γ)         (2-6) 
Where: 
β = shape parameter, 
α = scale parameter, 
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γ = location parameter, 
t = time 
The Weibull distribution has no characteristic shape. Depending upon the values of 
the parameters, it can be shaped to represent many distributions (Billinton & Allan, 1983). 
We note that, if γ = 0 and β = 1, the Weibull distribution is precisely an exponential 
distribution. Exponential distribution is thus a special case of Weibull distribution. 
The cumulative Weibull distribution i.e. the probability of failure Q(t), deduced 
from the above model, can be defined by equation 2-7 as (Semaan, 2011): 





            (2-7) 
2.5 Reliability of Water Distribution Networks 
The main task of a WDN is to provide consumers with a minimum acceptable level 
of supply (in terms of pressure, availability, and water quality) at all times under a range 
of operating conditions. The degree to which the network is able to achieve this, under both 
normal and abnormal conditions, is termed its reliability (Atkinson et al., 2014). Hence, 
reliability is considered as an integral part in making decisions regarding the planning, 
design, and operation phases of WDNs. Reliability assessment of WDN not only evaluates 
if the required performance will be met, but will also quantify to what extent the 
performance is satisfactory. 
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Reliability is basically the probability of survival of a component at time t. Hence, 
reliability of a component is the complement of probability of failure. Therefore, reliability 
and probability of failure are related by equation 2-8 (Chandrupatla, 2009): 
R(t) + Q(t) = 1            (2-8) 
In this thesis, reliability is assumed to follow negative exponential distribution 
which would mean that reliability decreases exponentially as the failure rate increases with 
time. Therefore, the reliability function for exponential distribution can be described as: 
R(t) = 1 − Q(t) = e−λt           (2-9) 
2.5.1 Definition of Reliability 
Although the reliability assessment of WDNs has gained considerable attention 
over the last two decades, there is still no common, acceptable, reliability definition or 
measure (Jalal, 2008). Many researchers defined reliability based on different conditions, 
as found in table 2-2. 
Note that the reliability of a WDN can be contemplated from two different 
perspectives: (1) the customer’s view: the main goal of modeling is to analyze and evaluate 
system reliability in the case of water delivery cut-offs and the duration of these 
suspensions; (2) the planner’s view: the main goal is to analyze and evaluate failures, 
examine various reliability states and undertake assessment of the system’s reliability. 
Although efforts have generally been premised on the second perspective, customer-based 
evaluation is also important (Jalal, 2008). 
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Table 2-2: Definitions of Reliability 
Authors Definitions 
Xu and Goulter (1999) 
WDN capacity reliability refers to the 
probability that the minimum required 
nodal pressures are met, under the 
assumption that the required nodal demand 
flows are met, and is a function of the 
uncertain nodal demands and the uncertain 
degree to which pipe hydraulic capacities 
will be reduced over the design period. 
Tanyimboh et al. (2001) 
Reliability is defined as the time-averaged 
value of the ratio of the flow supplied to the 
flow required. 
Shinstine et al. (2002) 
Reliability is defined as the probability that 
the distribution system will function at 
some minimum defined pressures while 
satisfying the demands (hydraulic 
availability) given the possible failure of 
different components. 
Kalungi and Tanyimboh (2003) 
Reliability is the extent to which the 
network can meet customer demands at 
adequate pressure under normal and 
abnormal operating conditions. 
Ostfeld (2004) 
Reliability is an inherent attribute of any 
system, referring to its ability to perform a 
mission adequately under stated 
environmental conditions for a prescribed 
time interval. 
Al-Zahrani and Syed (2006) 
Reliability of a WDN is its ability to 
deliver water to individual consumers in 
the required quantity and quality and under 
a satisfactory pressure head 
Ciaponi et al. (2012) 
Reliability of a hydraulic system is its 
ability to satisfy users taking into account 
the various working conditions to which it 
may be subjected during its operative life. 
Shuang et al. (2014) 
The reliability is defined as the probability 
that the WDN meet flow and pressure 
requirements under the possible 




2.5.2 Types of Reliability 
Reliability assessment of WDNs is usually classified in two main categories, 
relating to two types of failure. (1) Mechanical Reliability and (2) Hydraulic Reliability. 
2.5.2.1 Mechanical Reliability 
The structural condition of urban WDN is important for the continuity and quality 
of the water distribution services provided by such systems. Every human-made product 
and system, from simple products to complex structures, has certain unreliability and they 
deteriorate with time until they ultimately fail (Murthy, 2010). Mechanical reliability 
reflects the degree to which the WDN can continue to provide adequate levels of service 
during unplanned events such as mechanical/structural failure (e.g., pipe bursts, pump 
malfunction). 
2.5.2.2 Hydraulic Reliability 
A component failure may undermine the hydraulic integrity of a WDN and drop 
the pressure at demand nodes (Gheisi & Naser, 2015). Hydraulic reliability reflects how 
well the network can cope with changes over time, such as deterioration of components or 
demand variations (Atkinson et al., 2014). It can be described as the ability of the water 
distribution network to satisfy the nodal demands under both normal operating conditions 
as well as when one or more components of the system experience failure. 
On the other hand, some authors (Islam et al., 2014; Gupta et al., 2012) have also 
argued about water quality reliability which is assessed with respect to a predefined level 
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or range of selected water quality parameters (e.g., residual chlorine concentration). If the 
water quality parameter is within the prescribed range, the WDN is considered reliable, 
otherwise it is considered unreliable for water quality. However, the scope of this research 
is limited to the evaluation of reliability considering only mechanical and hydraulic aspects 
of WDN and its components. Water quality measures are usually studied independently. 
2.5.3 Reliability Assessment Methods 
A review of the literature reveals that there is no universally acceptable measure 
for the reliability of water distribution networks. It gained considerable research attention 
over the last few decades. This research has concentrated on methodologies for reliability 
assessment and for reliability inclusion in optimal design and operation of WDNs. This 
section provides a summary of these efforts. 
As reliability is not a network property that can be measured directly, it should be 
assessed based on other characteristics of the network that can be directly measured or 
calculated. Ostfeld (2004) categorized reliability assessment methods into (1) 
connectivity/topological, (2) hydraulic and (3) Entropy as a reliability surrogate. 
2.5.3.1 Connectivity 
The reliability which is based on the concept of connectivity refers to measures 
associated with the probability that a given network remains physically connected by 
taking into account the topology of the network. This type of measure mainly serves the 
purpose of evaluating mechanical reliability. Wagner et al. (1988) applied analytical 
methods and introduced the concepts of reachability and connectivity to assess the 
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reliability of a water distribution system, where reachability is defined as the probability 
that a given demand node is connected to at least one source, and connectivity as the 
probability that all demand nodes are connected to at least one source. Shamsi (1990) and 
Quimpo & Shamsi (1991) incorporated the use of node pair reliability (NPR) as the 
network reliability measure. The NPR is defined as the probability that a specific source 
and demand nodes are connected. This definition corresponds to the probability that at least 
one path is functional between the source node and the demand node considered. Goulter 
(1987) noted that network reliability is, in fact, defined, or more specifically constrained, 
by the fundamental layout of the network. Networks with better shapes (i.e. with more 
redundancy in terms of interconnections, etc.) will be more reliable. Yannopoulos and 
Spiliotis (2013) focused on topology of network as a measure for analyzing mechanical 
reliability. They developed a methodology based on adjacent matrix of graph theory in 
order to determine connectivity among different nodes. Measures used within this category 
do not consider the level of service provided to the consumers during a failure. The 
existence of a path between a source and a consumer node in a water distribution system, 
in a non-failure mode or once a failure has occurred does not guarantee a sufficient service 
(Ostfeld et al, 2002). 
2.5.3.2 Hydraulic 
The second category of reliability assessment i.e., hydraulic measure is concerned 
with the conveyance of desired quantities and qualities of water at required pressures to the 
appropriate locations at the appropriate times. Cullinane (1989) introduced nodal 
availability which is the portion of time when the nodal pressure is higher than the required 
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value for all demand patterns and different network component failures. Cullinane et al. 
(1992) examined the intermediate stage of partial pressure failure using the ‘nodal 
availability’ concept but, instead of assuming a binary index (i.e., zero when available 
pressure is less than required and one otherwise), they assumed a continuous fuzzy 
relationship. Xu and Goulter (1999) used a probabilistic hydraulic approach, based on the 
concept of the first-order reliability method (FORM), to determine the capacity reliability 
of the water distribution network, which is related to the hydraulic and demand variation 
failures, and is defined as the probability that the nodal demand is met at or over the 
prescribed minimum pressure for a fixed network configuration under random nodal 
demands and random pipe roughnesses. Shinstine et al. (2002), coupled a cut-set method 
with a hydraulic steady state simulation model that implicitly solves the continuity and 
energy equations for two large scale municipal water distribution networks in the Tucson 
Metropolitan Area in Arizona. The measure of reliability was defined as the probability of 
satisfying nodal demands and pressure heads for various possible pipe breaks in the water 
distribution network at any given time. Zhuang et al. (2011) presented a methodology for 
reliability and availability assessment of a WDN based on an adaptive pump operation. In 
response to a pipe break, pump operations were adapted using various sizes of pump 
combinations. In their method, they evaluate hydraulic reliability in terms of available 
water to fulfill desired demand. An accurate calculation of the hydraulic reliability of a 
given system requires data on its entire component reliabilities and their associated failure 
impacts on the consumer’s demands (Ostfeld, 2004). 
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2.5.3.3 Entropy as a Reliability Surrogate 
Entropy, as a surrogate measure for reliability is the third category which has been 
used by several researchers for reliability assessment during recent years (Shannon, 1948; 
Ostfeld, 2004; Setiadi et al. 2005; Prasad & Tanyimboh, 2009; Tanyimboh et al. 2011; 
Gheisi & Naser, 2014). The fundamental idea is to use Shannon’s (1948) entropy measure 
of uncertainty that quantifies the amount of information contained in a finite probability 
distribution, to measure the inherent redundancy of a network. In this regard, entropy is 
more related to the category of connectivity/topological analysis than to that of hydraulic 
reliability. It is assumed that distribution networks, which are designed to carry maximum 
entropy flows, are generally reliable (Ostfeld, 2004). A WDN with higher entropy is 
expected to cope better with simultaneous multi-pipe failure (Gheisi & Naser, 2014a). 
Prasad and Tanyimboh (2009) used flow Entropy, a statistical entropy measure for WDNs 
to show that surrogate reliability measure can be used effectively to improve reliability of 
multi-source networks. Tanyimboh et al. (2011) used statistical entropy and other surrogate 
measures such as network resilience, resilience index and modified resilience index, for 
the reliability assessment of WDN to assess the effectiveness of surrogate reliability 
measures in relation to more rigorous and accurate hydraulic reliability measures. Shibu 
and Janga Reddy (2012) presented a methodology based on cross-entropy for optimal 
design of WDN by considering the uncertainty in nodal demands and applied the 
methodology on two case studies, two-loop WDN and Hanoi WDN design under uncertain 
nodal demands, and compared the solutions with deterministic model solutions. Although 
more than a decade of research has passed, it is still an open question of what a given level 
of entropy means in terms of reliability for a particular system. Setiadi et al. (2005) 
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performed a comparative study between entropy and mechanical reliability (operation of 
the network after pipe failure), concluding that the two have a strong correlation despite 
having different methods of calculation. 
In this thesis, the concept of connectivity has been incorporated, and integrated with 
the hydraulic performance of a WDN for assessing network reliability. 
2.6 Network Reliability Analysis 
The evaluation of network reliability is a very broad concept. It has been observed 
in the examined literature that researchers have applied this concept for various engineering 
applications; subway networks (Gkountis, 2014; Semaan, 2011), pipeline networks (El 
Chanati, 2014; Salman, 2011) and bridges (Ghodoosi et al. 2013). They evaluated the 
network reliability based on series-parallel systems. 
2.6.1 Series Parallel Systems 
If the success of every component in the system results in the success of the system, 
then it is said to represent a series connection. The system is said to fail if any one of the 
components fails. The links in a bicycle chain may be considered components in series 
(Chandrupatla, 2009). A block diagram of a system with n components connected in series 
is shown in figure 2-8. 
1 2 3 n
 
Figure 2-8: Components in Series 
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The system reliability of components connected in series can be represented by 
equation 2-10: 
RS = R1R2R3……… . Rn = ∏ Ri
n
i=1         (2-10) 
Where: 
RS = System Reliability, 
Ri = Component Reliability 
If the success of any one of the components in the system results in the success of 
the system, then it is said to represent a parallel connection. The system fails only if all the 
components fail, but if at least one component is functioning then the system does not fail. 
If a twin engine turbojet can land safely with only one engine, this is because the engines 
are connected in parallel (Chandrupatla, 2009). A block diagram of a system with n 






Figure 2-9: Components in Parallel 
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The system reliability of components connected in parallel can be represented by 
equation 2-11: 
RS = 1 − Q1Q2Q3………Qn = 1 −∏ Qi
n
i=1        (2-11) 
Where: 
Qi = Probability of failure of a component 
In a water distribution network, the components i.e. segments form a combined 
series parallel system. For example, the network reliability for the system shown in Figure 















Figure 2-10: Series Parallel Network 
RS1 = R1R2           (2-12) 
RS2 = R3R4R5          (2-13) 
RS3 = R6R7           (2-14) 
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RSn = Rn−1Rn          (2-15) 
RN = 1 − QS1QS2QS3 ………QSn = 1 −∏ QSi
n
i=1       (2-16) 
Where: 
RN = Network reliability 
This method of assessing the network reliability has been employed by many 
researchers albeit for small sections of network. It is not convenient to be applied on large 
and complex networks, where there are large number of segments and bridge connections 
apart from series and parallel systems as shown in figure 2-11. For large and complex 





Figure 2-11: Bridge-type Network (Billinton & Allan, 1983) 
2.6.2 Minimum Cut Set Analysis 
Among the most well-defined processes to determine the topological/ mechanical 
reliability of a network is the process of minimum cut-set (Yannopoulos & Spiliotis, 2013). 
Tung (1985) discussed six techniques for WDN reliability evaluation and concluded that 
the cut-set method is the most efficient technique in evaluating the network reliability. 
Unlike other generic methods or techniques such as series-parallel systems, which can only 
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be applied for analyzing small networks, minimum cut set approach can be employed to 
effectively analyze complex and larger networks. 
A ‘cut set’ or a ‘minimum cut set’ can be defined as a minimum set of network 
segments which, when failed, causes failure of the network; but if just one segment of the 
set has not failed, no failure of network occurs. For instance, in Figure 2-12 the set of 
segments {a, c, h} is a cut set. There are many other cut sets, such as {a, b, g}, {d, h, f}, 
{b, c, e, d} and so on. The segment {i} alone is also a cut set because its failure would 















Figure 2-12: Network with Minimum Cut Sets 
Note that, if a cut set contains only a single segment, then it is termed as first order 
cut set; and if a cut set contains two segments, then it is termed as a second order cut set. 
Thus if a cut set contains n segments, it would be termed as nth order cut set. It should also 
be noted that, if a set of segments causing failure contains a cut set as a subset, then that 
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set of segments should not be recorded as a cut set. For example, the set of segments {a, c, 
h, d} causes the failure of network; but it has a cut set {a, c, h} as a subset; therefore {a, c, 
h, d} is not a cut set. This is because {a, c, h} is the minimum set of network segments to 
cause the network failure. Hence to emphasize this property, a cut set is referred as a 
minimum cut set in this thesis. 
Billinton and Allan (1983) enumerated the minimum cut sets for the bridge type 
network shown in figure 2-11, and quantified the network reliability using a set of 
equations 2-17 to 2-23: 
QN = P(C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4)         (2-17) 
= P(C1) + P(C2) + P(C3) + P(C4)        (2-18) 
Where:  
P(C1) = QAQB          (2-19) 
P(C2) = QCQD          (2-20) 
P(C3) = QAQDQE          (2-21) 
P(C4) = QBQCQE          (2-22) 
RN = 1 − QN           (2-23) 
Where: 
RN = Network reliability 
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QN = Probability of failure of network 
P(Ci) = Probability of failure of a minimum cut set i 












C2 C3 C4  
Figure 2-13: Minimum Cut Sets of Figure 2-11 
The minimum cut set approach has been adopted by researchers in diverse fields 
for the study of networks. Zhou et al. (2012) applied this method to compute the reliability 
of a power distribution network while Alhomidi and Reed (2013) identified minimum cut 
sets of attack graphs to aid in decision making using genetic algorithm. Yannopoulos and 
Spiliotis (2013) studied the reliability of WDN and enumerated minimum cut sets using 
adjacent matrix theory. Shinstine et al. (2002) analyzed four possible measures of 
reliability and availability of water distribution network using minimum cut set method 
with steady state simulation. 
The minimum cut-set approach is usually used in order to investigate the topology 
of a water distribution network and the detection of its critical elements, the failure of which 
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will affect the network operation. Thus this approach employs the concept of connectivity, 
and serves the purpose of evaluating mechanical reliability. 
2.6.3 Hydraulic Network Analysis 
A WDN is a large scale network with complex topological structure designed to 
convey volumes of water to consumers at required demands and under adequate pressure. 
But this course of transporting water to consumers involves much more complex hydraulic 
analysis. The hydraulic analysis of a WDN is required to be performed for monitoring the 
safe movement of water as it reaches consumers. Therefore, the primary purpose of this 
kind of network analysis is to ensure the conveyance of water at satisfactory pressure. And 
to serve this purpose, mainly two methods of network analysis are found to be extensively 
used in literature – Demand Driven Analysis (DDA) and Pressure Driven Analysis (PDA). 
The DDA approach is a traditional network analysis which has been widely used in 
the water industry for many years. This method assumes that consumer demands are always 
satisfied regardless of the pressures throughout the system and formulates the constitutive 
equations of flow accordingly to solve for the unknown nodal heads (Barun, 2009). The 
model gives acceptable results when WDNs are subject to normal operating conditions. 
However, WDNs are subject to component failures or very large demands, which may 
result in a reduction of the pressure in the system. In consequence, when the pressure drops 
below the required level, network analysts would have no information on how much water 
would be delivered by the system under the available pressure regime. In this situation 
some customers would receive reduced supplies and, in the worst scenario, they might not 
receive any supply at all. When this happens, demand-driven analysis (DDA) often gives 
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results that indicate that the system is still supplying the full demand at lower, and 
sometimes, negative pressures (Setiadi et al., 2005). 
Pressure Driven Analysis, also known as Head Dependent Analysis (HDA) has 
long been suggested to surpass demand driven analysis, particularly for networks under 
abnormal operating conditions. It is well known that outflows from a WDN are dependent 
upon the pressure within that system and, therefore, the DDA assumption that demands are 
always satisfied regardless of the pressure in the system is often inappropriate (Barun, 
2009). PDA takes into consideration the pressure dependency of nodal outflows, and in 
consequence, the results are more realistic. Although some researchers (Setiadi et al. 2005; 
Giustolisi et al. 2008; Pathirana 2011) have considered this issue in the past, computer 
programs for analyzing large systems with insufficient pressure in a routine manner were 
not commercially available in the recent past. But now, water industries have taken an 
initiative to include pressure dependent demand analysis in their hydraulic simulation 
software. One such example is WaterCad by Bentley. The objective of PDA is to establish 
the actual supply quantity and pressure at each node in a WDN (Kalungi & Tanyimboh, 
2003). A minor reduction in the network reliability which is caused due to consideration 
of nodal pressures yields noticeable cost savings in the design of WDN (Ghajarnia et al., 
2009).  
The analysis of flow conditions of this type of networks is customarily described 
by a set of equations expressing the relationship between three basic determinants, namely 
the flow, the diameter of the branches and the hydraulic head at each node (Tsakiris & 
Spiliotis, 2014). Distant computational methods such as Hardy Cross Method, Linear 
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Theory Method, Newton–Raphson Method and Gradient Algorithm are capable of solving 
the flow relationships in a WDN (Barun, 2009). And hence these methods are employed 
for the application of DDA or PDA in analyzing a hydraulic network. Yannopoulos and 
Spiliotis (2013) used the Newton Raphson Method for analyzing a WDN based on PDA 
for assessing the hydraulic reliability. Giustolisi and Laucelli (2011) presented a pressure-
driven analysis method, using the Enhanced Global Gradient Algorithm. Tsakiris and 
Spiliotis (2014) categorized the various methods proposed so far for the hydraulic network 
analysis into 5 generations as displayed in table 2-3. 
Table 2-3: Various Methods of Hydraulic Network Analysis 
Category Method 
First Generation Hardy Cross Method 
Second Generation Linear Method, Newton Raphson Method 
Third Generation Gradient Algorithm 
Fourth Generation Enhanced Global Gradient Algorithm 
Fifth Generation 
First Order Reliability, Fuzzy Sets and 
Systems 
Before the emergence of computers, the hydraulic network analysis were used to 
be done by means of manual calculation which was very tedious and time consuming. 
Nowadays modelling software are being used to simulate a hydraulic network and solve 
the flow equations. Different software like Epanet 2, Mike Net, AquaNet, H2ONet, 
WaterCAD, KYPipe etc. are available to perform hydraulic network analysis. Figure 2-14 
and figure 2-15 illustrates a screen grab of Epanet 2 and WaterCAD respectively. These 
software implements the algorithm based on computational methods as mentioned earlier. 
For example, Epanet 2 employs Gradient Algorithm for solving flow equations (Tsakiris 
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and Spiliotis, 2014). For this research, WaterCAD has been used to simulate a WDN and 
solve flow equations by employing Pressure Dependent Demand Analysis. 
 
Figure 2-14: Epanet Simulation Example (USEPA website) 
 
Figure 2-15: WaterCAD Simulation Example 
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Wagner et al. (1988) proposed the formulation as depicted in equation 2-24, for 











                            Hjmin ≤ Hj ≤ Hjreq
Qjreq                                                         Hjreq < Hj ≤ Hjmax
0                                               Hj > Hjmax
    (2-24) 
The network reliability for hydraulic analysis can be worked out by the equation 2-








          (2-25) 
Where: 
RN = Hydraulic Network Reliability 
Qjavl = Available demand at node j 
Qjreq = Required demand at node j 
Hj = Actual pressure head at node j 
Hjmin, Hjmax = Minimum and maximum pressure head at node j respectively 




2.7 Summary and Limitations 
This chapter provided a thorough insight on WDN and its components by 
attempting to define it and providing extensive literature about their reliability evaluation. 
Firstly, the different types of failures, causes and consequences for WDNs were discussed. 
Then, three probability distribution functions, frequently used in literature, were reviewed 
to estimate the probability of failure for WDNs based on collected historical data from 
operation and maintenance reports. Two types of reliability assessment models were 
identified from literature; mechanical reliability and hydraulic reliability. These models 
were reviewed to reveal the current state of the art for reliability assessment modeling and 
recognize current research gaps and limitations. The main limitations are the following: 
1) A failure of a component can occur due to one or more factors, and it is not easy to 
know the cause behind a failure. Relation among various factors have not been 
studied comprehensively. 
2) Water utilities usually ignore and do not record the causes which would help them 
identify the primary type of failure and relation among them. 
3) Although there were many attempts to assess reliability of WDNs and identify 
which pipes control flow inside such networks, these techniques were either applied 
to small scale networks or assessed mechanical and hydraulic reliability 
independently. An integrated reliability model would endeavor to accurately assess 
the network reliability. 
4) Although there were few models which attempted to analyze network for hydraulic 
properties based on pressure, many were found to be relying only on demands 
43 
 
without considering the effect of pressure. And those found to be pressure driven, 
were analyzed manually rather than analyzing in a simulating environment. 
5) Many models were found to be developed and implemented based on assumptions 
which may not produce desired results. 
Considering all the above limitations observed in the literature, there is a need for 
integrated reliability assessment models for WDNs considering simultaneously their 
structural and hydraulic properties. To make such integrated approach viable on real 
applications, the scalability and suitability of any developed models should be tested on 
large scale WDNs. Also, integrating reliability assessment models within available 
hydraulic simulation environments (i.e. WaterCad) can facilitate the computational time 
for integrated reliability assessment of WDNs and decrease chances for inadvertent errors.
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CHAPTER 3  
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology adapted in the course of model 
development. The methodology encompasses the modeling aspects of mechanical 
reliability, hydraulic reliability, and integrated reliability assessment. Figure 3-1 depicts 
the steps of the proposed approach. 
The first model is the mechanical reliability model which deals with analyzing the 
structural performance of a WDN and its components. The model initiates by assessing the 
mechanical reliability at component level which consists of accessories (Valves, Hydrants 
etc.) and individual pipes. These component reliabilities leads to the assessment of segment 
reliability which is a weighted composition of components. Then minimum cut set analysis 
is performed to aid in network analysis, finally ending the model with assessing the 
mechanical reliability of the selected sub-networks. 
For analyzing the hydraulic performance of a WDN, a hydraulic reliability model 
is developed. It involves the hydraulic simulation of a WDN in normal and failure 
conditions, which aid in obtaining the required as well as actual pressure head at demand 
nodes. The model is then formulated with pressure conditions to evaluate the available 
demand at demand nodes which in contrast to the required demand aids in predicting the 
hydraulic reliability of the selected sub network. An integrated reliability assessment model 






























































Figure 3-1: Detailed Methodology Flowchart 
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3.2 Literature Review 
An extensive literature review was performed to get acquainted with previous 
reliability assessment methods, identify their limitations and develop a new model by 
improving upon those shortcomings. It is thoroughly discussed in chapter 2, the summary 
of which is presented herein. 
In the course of performing the literature review, firstly, the different types of 
failures, their causes and consequences for WDNs were discussed. Then, three probability 
distribution functions, frequently used in literature, were reviewed to estimate the 
probability of failure for WDNs based on collected historical data from operation and 
maintenance reports. Two types of reliability assessment models were identified from 
literature; mechanical reliability and hydraulic reliability. These models were reviewed to 
reveal the current state of the art for reliability assessment modeling and recognize current 
research gaps and limitations. 
3.3 Mechanical Reliability Model 
This model commences by evaluating the failure rate of WDN components, 
followed by the assessment of component and segment reliabilities, and ultimately 
determines the sub-network mechanical reliability. Figure 3-2 depicts the detailed 
flowchart of the mechanical reliability model for water networks. The developed model 
utilizes reliability theory for assessing component and segment reliabilities, whereas 
minimum cut set approach is pursued for assessing mechanical reliability for the selected 
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Figure 3-2: Mechanical Reliability Model Flowchart 
3.3.1 Network Breakdown 
Water distribution networks are very large and complex interconnected networks 
that consist of an extremely high number of different components. This reality can bring 
about numerous difficulties when attempting to depict the entire network in a single 
scheme. In order to compute the mechanical reliability, a better understanding of WDN 
composition is required. Figure 3-3 illustrates the composition of water distribution 
networks. The mechanical reliability model breaks the network into zones which are in 
terms of sub-network based on the source of water supply. Each sub-network is also 
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divided into pipe segments. At this level, each segment consists of a series of pipe sections 
along with their accessories (i.e. hydrants and valves). 
Water Distribution Network
Sub-NetworkSub-Network
Segment Segment Segment Segment
Pipeline Accessories Pipeline Accessories
 
Figure 3-3: Water Distribution Network Composition (El Chanati, 2014) 
The process of breaking down a WDN depends on several factors such as 
population density, zoning type (i.e. residential, commercial, industrial, park, undeveloped, 
etc.), tax rate, limitation supporting of major infrastructure such as pumps etc. (Salman, 
2011). In this thesis, the network is clustered into zones according to their water supply 
source. The main idea behind this selection emerges from the fact that different sources of 
water possess different characteristics which may differ in terms of elevation, pumping 
stations set up and amount of water supplied. These characteristics of a water source may 
regulate the pressure at demand nodes and hence affecting the functionality of a WDN. 
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3.3.2 Failure Rate 
Many researchers (Shinstine et al., 2002; Salman, 2011; Yannopoulos and Spiliotis, 
2013) have chosen failure rate as the primary indicator of reliability. Quantitatively, it is 
defined as the number of breaks per year per unit length. Breaks are considered one of the 
significant factors contributing to water losses and require substantial human effort and 
cost to repair such failures. As the number of breaks increases, the reliability of a WDN 
decreases. The most often applied formulae for estimating the pipe failure rate have been 
obtained using simple regression models on the available pipe failure data from a limited 
time period. In this thesis, the pipe failure rate or breakage rate is computed using a 
regression model based on age of pipe. According to this model, the failure rate of a pipe 
can be expressed as given by equation 3-1 (Karimian et al., 2015): 
λpipe = 6 × 10
−6𝑋2 + 0.0004𝑋 + 0.0026          (3-1) 
Where: 
X is the age of pipe in years 
λpipe is the failure rate of pipe expressed in number of breaks per unit length of pipe. 
The failure rate of other components (hydrants, valves, controls) can be expressed 








Nf is the number of failures 
λaccessory is the failure rate of component expressed in number of failures per unit 
length of segment. 
3.3.3 Component Reliability 
After determining the failure rates of pipes and other components, the reliability of 
the component can be found. The reliability is assumed to follow negative exponential 
distribution which would mean that reliability decreases exponentially as the failure rate 
increases with time. This can be computed using equation 3-3: 
Rc = e
−λt             (3-3) 
Where: 
Rc = reliability of a component 
λ = failure rate of a pipe or accessory 
t = time 
3.3.4 Segment Reliability 
As discussed earlier in chapter 2, a segment is defined as a water main pipe or a 
group of connected pipes in series (along with all the associated components) which is 
located between two nearest intersections. Figure 2-3 portrays a typical segment which has 
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hydrant, valve, and branch pipe attached to it. According to the definition, the segment 
reliability can be expressed by equation 3-4: 
RSeg = ∑RC             (3-4) 
The above equation represents segment reliability where components have the same 
weight which is not true. Each component has its relative importance in a segment. To be 
more specific in determining segment reliability, a relative weight component (wi) is 
included in equation 3-4 to adjust it. 
RSeg = ∑ RCiwi
n
i=1             (3-5) 
Where: 
i = water main component 
n = total number of water main components 
wi = relative weight of component 
The relative weight of component (wi) characterize the relative importance of each 
component in the composition of a segment. Mathematically, it is the ratio of weight of 
component under consideration to the total weight of components in that particular segment 
52 
 
as shown in equation 3-6. The weights of components are obtained from Salman (2011) 
which will be detailed in chapter 4. 
Relative Weight (wi) =
Weight of component
Sum of weights of all components
       (3-6) 
3.3.5 Network/Sub-Network Reliability 
The network has to be analyzed for the study of its configuration prior to assessing 
the network reliability, because it consists of several segments connected in various ways. 
The reliability of a small and simple network, where its segments are connected in series 
and/or parallel can be determined by using equations 2-10 to 2-16. But, if a network is large 
and complex with several bridge connections as in most cases, its configuration needs to 
be studied extensively. For this purpose, the network is analyzed using minimum cut set 
approach as it can be employed to effectively analyze complex and larger networks as 
discussed in literature. 
The procedure for determining the network reliability of a WDN based on the 
minimum cut-set method is as follows. 
1. Probability of failure of segments 
Minimum cut set analysis of a network requires the probability of failure of its 
segments to later formulate the network reliability assessment. Quantitatively, the 
probability of failure of a segment is the complement of its reliability (Chandrupatla, 2009) 
and can be determined by equation 3-7 as: 
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QSeg = 1 − RSeg            (3-7) 
Where: 
Qseg = probability of failure of a segment 




















combination of 2 
segments
Repeat for 







Figure 3-4: Minimum Cut Set Analysis 
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To identify the minimum cut sets of a network in a reduced computational time, a 
method generally used in power transmission networks for the same purpose has been 
adopted (Zhou et al., 2012). It involves 1) finding all possible paths from the source node 
to the demand node, 2) constructing a path matrix and 3) getting minimum cut sets from 
the path matrix. While the method for power transmission networks involves finding 
minimum cut sets for a single demand node, the developed model in this thesis expands 
upon to include and implement the adopted method to all demand nodes as it is the primary 
objective of a WDN design to successfully supply water to all demand nodes. Figure 3-4 
illustrates the detailed procedure for minimum cut set analysis. Note that the procedure has 
to be repeated for each and every demand node in the network. To facilitate this tedious 
process, it has been coded in MATLAB R2013b programming environment along with the 
utilization of Wolfram Mathematica 10.2 and Microsoft Excel 2013.  
The process of minimum cut sets identification commences by inputting the WDN 
and enumerating all possible paths from a source node to a demand node under 
consideration (Mathematica 10.2). A path is a connection between a source node and a 
demand node. This model considers a node to be adequately supplied as long as there is at 
least one link connecting it to the rest of the network which means that the network is not 
considered as failed even if there is a single path from the source node to the demand node. 
After finding all possible paths, a path matrix is constructed in which, number of rows is 
equivalent to the number of paths from source node to demand node under consideration, 
and number of columns is equivalent to the number of segments (or combinations of 
segments) in a network (Mathematica 10.2). This matrix is a zero-one matrix with 1 as its 
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(i, j)th entry if the segment is present in the path to the demand node, and 0 as its (i, j)th 
entry if it is not. In other words, if the path matrix is 𝐏 = [pij], then: 
pij = 1              if segment is part of the path to demand node 
      = 0              if segment is not a part of the path to demand node 
For example, there are 3 segments A, B and C in a network and the possible paths 
from the source node to the demand node are AB and AC. Then the path matrix is expressed 
as 
Table 3-1: Path Matrix Example 
A B C 
AB 1 1 0 
AC 1 0 1 
Once the path matrix is constructed for the demand node under consideration, the 
network is analyzed for minimum cut sets. First order cut set is a single segment which 
when fails, causes the failure of entire network. Similarly, second order cut set is the 
combination of two segments, the combined failure of which causes the failure of entire 
network. If any column in a path matrix contains all elements as 1, then the segment 
corresponding to that column is recorded as a first order cut set. For example, all the 
elements of the first column in the matrix table 3-1 are 1. Hence segment {A} is recorded 
as a first order cut set. To find the second order cut sets, create all combinations of 2 
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segments and construct a new path matrix by merging the elements as per the combinations. 
For example, combination of 2 segments for the above example network are {A, B}, {B, 
C} and {C, A}. New path matrix would be 
Table 3-2: Modified Path Matrix Example 
A + B B + C C + A 
AB 1 1 1 
AC 1 1 1 
From the matrix table 3-2, combination of B and C results in a column with all 
elements as 1. Hence {B, C} is recorded as second order cut set. Note that, any combination 
with A is neglected here because A is already a minimum cut set (as discussed in chapter 
2). The same procedure is followed for finding third and higher order cut sets with 
combinations of corresponding segments. All the identified cut sets are recorded in Excel 
spreadsheets for further calculations. 
3. Mechanical reliability of WDN based on Minimum Cut Set 
According to Shinstine et al. (2002), for n components (segments) in the ith 
minimum cut set of a WDN, the failure probability of the jth component (segment) is Qj, 




Q(MCi) = ∏ Qj
n
j=1             (3-8) 
Where n is the number of segments in corresponding minimum cut set. 
Assuming that the occurrence of the failure of the components within a minimum 
cut set are statistically independent. For example, if a water distribution network has four 
minimum cut sets, MC1, MC2, MC3, and MC4, for the network reliability, the failure 
probability of the network QN, is then defined as follows (Billinton and Allan 1983): 
QN = Q(MC1 ∪ MC2 ∪MC3 ∪MC4)          (3-9) 
By applying the principle of inclusion and exclusion, equation 3-9 can be reduced 
to: 
QN = Q(MC1) + Q(MC2) + Q(MC3) + Q(MC4)      (3-10) 
QN = ∑ Q(MCi)
M
i=1           (3-11) 
Where M is the number of minimum cut-sets in the network. 
Finally, the mechanical reliability of the network can be obtained by equation 3-12 
as: 
RNM = 1 − QN = 1 − ∑ Q(MCi)
M
i=1         (3-12) 
Where: RNM = Mechanical reliability of network/sub-network 
QN = Failure probability of network/sub-network 
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3.4 Hydraulic Reliability Model 
This model deals with analyzing the hydraulic performance of a WDN in the form 
of hydraulic reliability. It commences with importing the shape files of the selected sub 
network along with its attributes to Bentley WaterCAD (ArcMap 10.3.1; WaterCAD V8i) 
for the hydraulic simulation of a WDN in normal and failure conditions. The simulation 
results from both conditions respectively aid in obtaining the required as well as actual 
pressure head at demand nodes. The model is then formulated with pressure conditions in 
spreadsheets to evaluate the available demand at demand nodes which is then compared to 
the required demand for assessing the hydraulic reliability of the selected sub network. 






















Figure 3-5: Hydraulic Reliability Model 
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3.4.1 Import Shape File of Network/Sub-Network 
The shape files of entire water distribution network are accessible through 
geodatabases of cities under consideration. Each water asset, feature class, is designed to 
have its physical and functional attributes stored in a separate table. The table is located 
inside the ArcGIS geodatabase and it is called feature attribute table. Any feature class can 
have only one geographic location and therefore each feature attribute table is connected 
to one geographic table (Youssef, 2015). Figure 3-6 shows the geodatabase configuration 
design. Note that the figure 3-6 depicts the required attributes for a feature class in this 












Figure 3-6: Geodatabase Configuration 
WaterCAD V8i simulation engine contains a distinctive tool named ModelBuilder. 
Using ModelBuilder, a hydraulic model of the selected sub-network is created by importing 
the shape files of required feature classes/assets/components to WaterCAD V8i simulation 
engine. The created hydraulic model inherits the attributes of all components from the 
imported shape files, thus curtailing the tedious task of inputting them manually. This is 
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significant in a way as it allows to simulate and analyze as much larger and complex 
networks. Figure 3-7 displays a screen grab of ModelBuilder tool. 
 
Figure 3-7: Screen Grab of ModelBuilder 
3.4.2 Nodal Demand Allocation 
The hydraulic performance of a WDN is analyzed based on its ability to meet the 
demands placed on it. The data availability of nodal demands will make the simulation 
more accurate and realistic in analyzing the hydraulic reliability. However, this data is not 
easily available and the absence of such crucial information would limit the ability for 
testing the developed hydraulic component of the reliability assessment model. Therefore 
in a case of data unavailability of nodal demands, the hydraulic reliability model utilizes 
the unit demand control center tool which draws the demand data from engineering library 
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developed by Bentley. This library contains industry used protocols for assuming demands 
based on the type of supplied consumers (home, café, restaurant, school, hospital…etc.). 
In an attempt to improve the accuracy of demand allocation, Google Earth Pro is used to 
view the geospatial position of the sub-network and determine the number and types of 
consumers at each node. Figure 3-8 displays the partial screen grab of unit demand control 
center tool. These allocated demands are thus the required customer demands to be met at 
nodes. 
 
Figure 3-8: Screen Grab of Unit Demand Control Center 
3.4.3 Hydraulic Simulation 
Once the demand allocation is completed, the hydraulic model of the WDN is 
configured for simulation. The accuracy of simulation results depends on how well the 
model is equipped. Utmost care should be taken to verify the imported data, as sometimes 
the shape files contain incomplete data for some parts. 
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In order to meet the customers’ daily needs, each component of the WDN must be 
able to provide required water demand and pressure head under both normal and failure 
conditions. Therefore, the developed research framework requires the hydraulic model to 
be simulated in normal as well as failure condition to assess the overall hydraulic 
performance of the network. 
Normal Condition
Failure Condition








Recorded Cut Set(s) from 
Mechanical Reliability Model










If Hmin ≤ Havl ≤ Hreq
Then Eq. 3-14
If Havl < Hmin
Then Eq. 3-13
If Havl > Hmax
Then Eq. 3-16
If Hreq < Havl ≤ Hmax
Then Eq. 3-15




Figure 3-9: Hydraulic Simulation Detailed Flowchart 
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The hydraulic model of a WDN is said to in normal condition when all the segments 
are functional and satisfy the nodal demands at required pressure. In the course of preparing 
the hydraulic model for simulation in normal condition, initial setting of segments are 
configured to remain in ‘open’ status to allow the flow of water through them. The required 
demands have already been allocated by now using the unit demand control center as 
mentioned in section 3.4.2. The hydraulic model is now set to be run for simulation as it 
has been constructed to meet the conditions of functional segments as well as required 
demands (allocated) at nodes. Finally, the constructed hydraulic model is simulated and 
the required pressure head at nodes to meet the customers’ demands are obtained as shown 
in figure 3-9. These nodal pressure heads are recorded as service pressure heads (Hreq) 
which need to be satisfied for supplying water at required demands. 
Nodal Demand Allocation
Lreq











Figure 3-10: Hydraulic Reliability Model Cut Set(s) Analysis Flowchart 
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If at-least one of the segments is non-functional and halts the flow of water through 
it, then the hydraulic model of a WDN is said to be in failure condition. Note that, this does 
not imply the failure of a WDN as there may be other segments through which the water 
can propagate to reach the nodes. However, this unavailability of a segment may lead to 
reduced level of water supply at nodes, partially fulfilling the customers’ demands. The 
hydraulic model is constructed for failure condition by configuring the initial setting of 
segments to ‘closed’ status. As illustrated in figure 3-10, the simulations are run by 
considering the failure of each individual segment to scrutinize the hydraulic performance 
of WDN in each failure condition and this makes the task tedious. However, WaterCAD 
V8i allows to create a scenario for each failure condition and batch run the simulation of 
all scenarios at once reducing the task tediousness. The hydraulic model is also simulated 
for failure condition by considering the closure of minimum cut sets identified in 
mechanical reliability model because these segment(s) causes the isolation/disconnection 
of a node. The simulations of the hydraulic model in failure conditions results in the 
available pressure head (Havl) at nodes as depicted in figure 3-9. 
The developed hydraulic reliability model is then formulated with pressure 
conditions which aid in achieving the actual/available demand at nodes by comparing the 
simulation results with that of service pressure head (Hreq), minimum pressure head (Hmin) 
and maximum pressure head (Hmax). The designed minimum and maximum pressure heads 
for a WDN will be detailed in chapter 4. As illustrated in figure 3-9, the evaluation of 
available demand at nodes is based on the formulation of pressure conditions proposed by 
Wagner et al. (1988) and modified by Shuang et al. (2012) and can be summarized in 
equations 3-13 to 3-16 as follows: 
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 Hmin ≤ Havl ≤ Hreq      (3-14) 
Lavl = Lreq   Hreq < Havl ≤ Hmax      (3-15) 
Lavl = 0   Havl > Hmax       (3-16) 
Where: 
Hreq = Required pressure head at a node (m) 
Havl = Available pressure head at a node (m) 
Hmin & Hmax = Minimum and maximum pressure head at a node respectively (m) 
Lreq = Required demand at a node (m3/day) 
Lavl = Available demand at a node (m3/day) 
The developed hydraulic reliability model is flexible in that it allows to 
accommodate the data about as many types of components that are available. For instance, 
if the data about valves, pumps, tanks etc. is available, then these components can be easily 
included in the model for hydraulic simulation. As mentioned earlier in this section, the 





3.4.4 Network Hydraulic Reliability 
The final step in the development of hydraulic reliability model is the reliability 
assessment of selected network/sub-network. For this purpose, the definition of reliability 
as suggested by Zhuang et al. (2013) has been adopted. Mathematically, the hydraulic 
reliability of a WDN can be expressed as the ratio of the available demand to the require 








          (3-17) 
Where: 
RH(x) = Hydraulic reliability of a network/sub-network in failure condition x 
Ljreq = Required demand at node j 
Ljavl = Available demand at node j 
Equation 3-17 aids in evaluating the hydraulic reliability of a WDN in failure 
condition ‘x’. The actual hydraulic reliability of a WDN can be assessed by equation 3-18 
as the average of hydraulic reliability in all failure conditions.  
RNH =
∑RH(x)
Number of Minimum Cut Sets
        (3-18) 
Where: 
RNH = Hydraulic reliability of a network/sub-network 
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3.5 Integrated Network Reliability 
The need for integrated reliability assessment was identified from the literature. It 
is evaluated based on the list of causes of failures as proposed in NRC (2006) best practice 
guide for assessing and reducing risks in drinking water distribution systems. It lists the 
most possible causes of failures accordingly categorizing them into mechanical and 
hydraulic types as will be elaborated in chapter 4. The integrated reliability of the selected 
network/sub-network is assessed by the equation 3-18 as follows: 
RN =
No.of structural failures×RNM+No.of hydraulic failures×RNH
Total number of failures
    (3-19) 
Where: 
RN = Integrated mechanical and hydraulic network reliability 
RNM = Mechanical reliability of the network 
RNH = Hydraulic reliability of the network 
The information about the condition of a WDN component is found from the 
operation and maintenance reports of the WDN. These reports contains the detailed 
information about the cause of a failure as recorded by the water utility. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, two models of reliability were described which are later integrated 
for assessing the overall reliability of a WDN. The first model was the mechanical 
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reliability model which deals with analyzing the structural performance of a WDN at the 
component, segment and network levels. This model utilizes reliability theory for assessing 
component and segment reliabilities, whereas minimum cut set approach is pursued for 
assessing mechanical reliability for the selected sub networks. To facilitate this tedious 
process, it has been coded in MATLAB R2013b programming environment along with the 
utilization of Wolfram Mathematica 10.2 and Microsoft Excel 2013. The second model 
analyzes the hydraulic performance of a WDN in terms of hydraulic reliability. It 
commences by importing the shape files of selected sub-network to WaterCAD V8i 
simulation engine. The imported hydraulic model is then equipped with required demands 
and any other available data about valves, hydrants, pumps etc. for the hydraulic simulation 
of a WDN in normal and failure conditions. The simulation results aid in obtaining the 
required as well as actual pressure head at demand nodes. The model is then formulated 
with pressure conditions to evaluate the available demand at demand nodes which in 
contrast to the required demand aids in predicting the hydraulic reliability of the selected 
sub network. An integrated reliability assessment model was presented to conclude the 
research methodology by determining the overall sub network reliability.
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CHAPTER 4  
Data Collection 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the process of data collection is discussed. Data is collected from 
four sources: (a) Literature, (b) Database (ArcGIS) for the city of London and Doha, (c) 
Best practice guides, and (d) Bentley WaterCAD library. All these four sources contribute 






















Figure 4-1: Data Collection Sources 
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In the next sections, each source of data is discussed in detail to explain their 
contribution in structuring the research framework. Mutual observations among the two 
analyzed datasets will also be covered as well. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Salman (2011) attended meetings with the asset management team for the City of 
Hamilton and two consultant expert teams working in municipal infrastructure as part of 
his research. They proposed the following weighting structure shown in Table 4-1 for 
WDN components to reflect their relative importance in the overall constitution of 
assessing reliability for a water segment. The additive weighted sum of reliability scores 
for the components shown in Table 4-1 represents the reliability score for each segment. 
This improves the accuracy in the evaluation of reliability and thus facilitates the 
maintenance, repair, rehabilitation planning and budget allocation processes. The same 
weighting structure will be adapted to the developed model as elaborated in Chapter 3. 
Table 4-1: Component Weights (Salman, 2011) 




Isolation Valve 28 




4.3 City of London 
According to the 2013 infrastructure report (SOI) for the City of London, the WDN 
is divided into two regional water systems; 1) Elgin Area Primary Water Supply System 
and 2) Lake Huron Primary Water Supply System. 
The Lake Huron Primary Water Supply System draws raw water from Lake Huron 
and manages a water treatment plant located north of the village of Grand Bend in South 
Huron. The plant has a current rated treatment capacity of 340 Million liters per day (75 
Million Imperial gallons per day) and serves a population of approximately 350,000 
people. 
The Elgin Area Primary Water Supply System draws raw water from Lake Erie and 
manages a water treatment plant located east of the village of Port Stanley in Central Elgin. 
The plant has a current rated treatment capacity of 91 Million liters per day (20 Million 
Imperial gallons per day) and serves a population of approximately 112,000 people. 
The City of London supplied 44,944,353,000 liters of water and served the 
estimated population of about 370,000 in the year 2014 (SOI, 2014). The city covers a land 
area of 420.5 square kilometers and owns a water network of about 1565 km with total 
replacement value of $2.6 billion (SOI, 2013). 
Two sub-networks are selected, one supplied by Lake Huron and the other supplied 
by Elgin Area (Lake Erie). These sub-networks are categorized into North Phase (Lake 
Huron) and South Phase (Lake Erie). These sub-networks are utilized to test and 








Figure 4-3: Selected Sub-Networks - City of London
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The total number of pipe segments in the network are 23,855 which are clustered 
according to their size and material type as shown in Table 4-2. Around 93% of the total 
number of pipes have a diameter less than 300mm; while large diameter pipes (900mm+) 
constitute a small fraction of the city network (0.43%). This explains that the need for large 
diameter pipes is only for transmission of water from the source to the distribution pipes. 
Also, ductile and cast iron pipes represents 60% of the total number of the pipes followed 
by PVC which constitutes 28% of the total water network. Cast iron pipes occupied around 
93.3% of failure records in City of London data. 
Table 4-2: Percentage Composition of Pipe Attributes 
Attribute Value Percentage 
Pipe Diameter 
< 300mm 93.71 
300mm – 600mm 5.18 
600 mm – 900mm 0.68 
> 900mm 0.43 
Pipe Material 
Cast Iron 42.04 






Table 4-3: Attributes from Database of London 
Attribute Minimum Maximum 
Age (Years) 28 137 
Length (m) 0.6 1931 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 20 1350 
C Factor 25 150 
Node Elevation 147.6 367.48 
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The condition of pipes and accessories such as valves, chambers, hydrants was 
measured on a 5 class scale as shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4: Asset Condition (State of Infrastructure Report, 2013) 
4.4 City of Doha 
According to the Qatar Environment & Energy Research Institute (QEERI), Qatar 
is one of the largest per capita water consumers in the world, with consumption levels 
quadruple that of the average European consumer. QEERI forecasted that by 2022 the 
demand for water is likely to increase by 50% due to the influx of tourists. A major 
challenge is to provide sufficient and sustainable water distribution networks for the State 
of Qatar (Al Malki 2008; Wittholz et al. 2008). Qatar has very scarce water resources. Its 
limited groundwater resources have been over exploited and as the reserves deplete, quality 
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far below the internationally recognized ‘water poverty line’ of 1000 m3 per person per 
year (Touati et al., 2013). The State of Qatar depends on desalinated seawater to satisfy 
99% of its municipal water demand (QEERI). For this purpose, currently there are five 
desalination plants in Qatar with a total production capacity of 217 MIGD (986,000 
m3/day), and two additional desalination plants are being constructed with a combined 
capacity of 108 MIGD (491,000 m3/day). On the other hand, the northern groundwater 
aquifer is the major source of groundwater in Qatar, estimated to contain 550,000 MIG 
(2,500 million m3) of freshwater, which is mostly used for agriculture (Atilhan et al., 2012). 
The City of Doha serves the estimated population of about 797,000 as of 2010 
(KNOEMA, 2014) and covers a land area of 132.1 square kilometers. Albeit there is no 
source of information about the length of water network in Doha; Qatar is found to own 
5,400 km of transmission and distribution pipes for the safe transport of quality water to 
consumers (Atilhan et al., 2012). 
Qatar University’s WDN (located in Doha, Qatar) was selected as a second case 
study. The database only had limited information about water pipelines and their 
accessories. Unlike the City of London, no information was recorded about the breakage 
rate, demand nodes and elevation, causes of each pipe failure, description of the breakage 




Figure 4-5: Qatar University WDN
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The total number of pipe segments in the selected sub-network is 127 which are 
clustered according to their size and material type (Table 4-4). Around 95% of water pipes 
are made of ductile iron; and the rest are made of HDPE. The pipe size ranges from 80mm 
to 400mm; with 300mm occupying 58% of the network. 
Table 4-4: Percentage Composition of Pipe Attributes 
Attribute Value Percentage 
Pipe Size 
≤ 150mm 17.32% 
150mm – 300mm 76.38% 
> 300mm 6.3% 
Pipe Material Ductile Iron 95% 
HDPE 5% 
Table 4-5: Attributes from Database of Doha 
Attribute Minimum Maximum 
Age (Years) 4 33 
Length (m) 0.6 658.93 
Pipe Diameter (mm) 80 400 
4.5 Best Practices 
NRC (2006) best practice guide for assessing and reducing risks in drinking water 
distribution systems lists the most possible causes of failures accordingly categorizing them 
into mechanical and hydraulic types. This list of causes of failure aid in identifying the 
exact failure type and help in assessing the integrated mechanical and hydraulic network 
reliability. Table 4-6 demonstrates these possible causes and their consequences as adopted 
and listed in chapter 2. 
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 Too high internal water 
pressure or surges  
 Shifting earth 
 Exposure to UV light 
 Stress from overburden 
 Temperature fluctuations, 
freezing 
 Natural disasters 
 Failure due to aging and 
weathering 
 Contamination of Mains, Fittings, 
and Appurtenances 
 Contamination of Storage Facilities 
 Contamination Due to the Absence 
or Operational Failure of Backflow 
Prevention Devices 
Hydraulic 
 Pipe Deterioration 
 Pressure Transients and 
Changes in Flow Regime 
 Hydraulic Changes 
during Maintenance and 
Emergencies 
 Tuberculation and Scale 
 Inadequate Operational 
Control 
 External Contamination 
 Sedimentation 
 Reduction in Hydraulic Capacity 
and Associated Increase in 
Pumping Costs 
 Poor Water Quality from Sediment 
Suspension and Removal of Scales 
Pressure requirements for assessing the hydraulic performance of the selected sub-
networks are adopted as given by Design Specification and Requirements Manual (2015) 
for the City of London. It proposed the maximum residual pressure should not exceed 550 
kPa (80 psi) and a minimum residual pressure shall not be below 275 kPa (40 psi) for 
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designing a water distribution network. Also, Fire Underwriters Survey (1999) 
recommends the amount of water required for fire flow, which is specified based on 
average area per hydrant. These specifications were used in developing hydraulic reliability 
model. 
4.6 Bentley WaterCAD 
The collected datasets for the cities of London and Doha did not include any 
information regarding water demand at nodes. The absence of such crucial information 
would limit the ability for testing the developed hydraulic component of the reliability 
assessment model. The demand allocation for the selected sub-networks was created with 
the in-built engineering library of Bentley WaterCAD. This library contains industry used 
protocols for assuming demands based on the type of supplied consumers (home, café, 
restaurant, school, hospital…etc.). Figure 4-5 visualizes the engineering library developed 
by Bentley. 
 




Two datasets from the Cities of London and Doha were analyzed along with 
concerned literature. The required data for the developed research framework were 
assembled from four sources and used as inputs to test the developed models using three 
selected sub-networks. The crucial information about water demand allocation was 
estimated from the engineering library of Bentley WaterCAD.
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CHAPTER 5  
Model Implementation 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, two case studies are worked out to demonstrate the use of the 
developed research methodology for which the data were obtained from the Cities of 
London, Ontario and Doha, Qatar. In the first case study, two sub-networks are selected 
from the City of London, Ontario in order to observe any differences in the hydraulic 
properties, as they are supplied by different sources of water. The sensitivity analysis is 











Figure 5-1: Model Implementation 
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5.2 City of London 
As discussed in chapter 4, the City of London receives its water from two regional 
water systems over which the City plays a significant management role. 
1. Elgin Area Primary Water Supply System 
2. Lake Huron Primary Water Supply System 
 
Figure 5-2: City of London Water System (City of London Official Website, 2015) 
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Two sub-networks were selected, one supplied by Lake Huron and the other 
supplied by Elgin Area (Lake Erie). These sub-networks were categorized into North Phase 
(Lake Huron) and South Phase (Lake Erie). The model implementation demonstrates the 
capabilities of the developed models with respect to network reliability. 
5.2.1 North Phase 
5.2.1.1 Mechanical Reliability Model 
After extracting the required data of the selected sub network from ArcGIS, the 
network is analyzed for the evaluation of reliability at component and segment levels in 
standard Excel spreadsheets. The probability of failure of segments are also evaluated at 
this stage which later aids in assessing the reliability at network/sub-network level. Table 
5-1 depicts the collected data and reliability calculations of segment ‘a’ and segment ‘b’ 
belonging to north phase sub-network as shown in figure 5-3. 
 
Figure 5-3: North Phase Sub-Network Model (ArcMap 10.3.1) 
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Segment ‘a’ is composed of two components (i.e. a pipe and a valve) whereas 
segment ‘b’ consists of three components (i.e. a pipe, a valve and a hydrant) as shown in 
column 2 of table 5-1. Total number of failures of components occurred till date are 
recorded in column 3. The data for the number of failures of components other than pipes 
was not available and hence they are assumed to aid in model implementation. In order to 
make the implementation more accurate, the number of failures of accessories (i.e. valves 
and hydrants) are assumed to reflect upon the age of the pipes contained in a segment.  The 
failure rate of pipes and accessories are computed based on equations 3-1 and 3-2 
respectively. Based on these failure rates, reliability is assessed at component level using 
equation 3-3. The weights of components in a typical segment are derived from table 4-1 
which are normalized to find the relative weight of a component in forming a segment 
using equation 3-6. These relative weights aid in assessing the reliability at segment level 
based on equation 3-5. In addition, probability of failure of segments is also evaluated 
based on equation 3-7. 




























































































































Pipe 1 0 
84 153.33 
0.0785 0.9245 0.38 0.58 
0.9429 0.0571 Valve 1 5 0.0326 0.9679 0.28 0.42 
      Sum 0.66   
b 
Pipe 1 0 
2 189.03 
0.0034 0.9966 0.38 0.39 
0.9955 0.0045 
Valve 1 1 0.0053 0.9947 0.28 0.29 
Hydrant 1 1 0.0053 0.9947 0.31 0.32 
      Sum 0.97   
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The reliability of components in segment ‘a’ are found to be 0.9245 and 0.9679 
where as in segment ‘b’, they are found to be 0.9966, 0.9947 and 0.9947. The difference 
in reliabilities of pipes in both the segments can be attributed to their age. This results in a 
segment reliability of 0.9429 for segment ‘a’ and 0.9955 for segment ‘b’. The relatively 
high reliability for segment ‘b’ than segment ‘a’ as it can be seen from table 5-1, is clearly 
a depiction of relatively newer components and less number of failures in segment ‘b’. 
Similarly, the reliabilities of all components are evaluated based on which the reliability of 
segments in north phase sub-network are calculated which are shown in table 5-2. Based 
on these results, segment ‘b’ is found to be most reliable, whereas segment ‘v’ is the least 
reliable and takes the priority in scheduling in case of rehabilitation. 
Table 5-2: Segment Reliabilities and Failure Probabilities of North Phase Sub-Network 
Segment Segment Reliability Probability of failure of segments 
a 0.9429 0.0571 
b 0.9955 0.0045 
c 0.9285 0.0715 
d 0.9293 0.0707 
e 0.9337 0.0663 
f 0.9683 0.0317 
g 0.9662 0.0338 
h 0.9403 0.0597 
i 0.9934 0.0066 
j 0.9638 0.0362 
k 0.9918 0.0082 
l 0.9733 0.0267 
m 0.9764 0.0236 
n 0.9519 0.0481 
o 0.9495 0.0505 
p 0.9575 0.0425 
q 0.9567 0.0433 
r 0.9558 0.0442 
s 0.9836 0.0164 
t 0.9484 0.0516 
u 0.9273 0.0727 
v 0.9165 0.0835 
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The next stage in this model is to assess the mechanical reliability at network/sub-
network level, for which the sub-network is analyzed using minimum cut set method. For 
this purpose, the selected sub-network in north phase is constructed as shown in figure 5-




Figure 5-4: North Phase Sub-Network Model (Mathematica 10.2) 
The process of minimum cut sets identification commences by inputting the WDN 
and enumerating all possible paths from a source node to a demand node under 
consideration, and constructing a path matrix for that node (Mathematica 10.2). Table 5-3 
lists all possible paths from the source node 1 to demand node 4. 
There are 22 segments in the north phase sub-network which forms the number of 
columns of a path matrix, whereas the number of rows are formed by 44 possible paths 
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which are followed by the water to reach the demand node 4. Table 5-4 represents the path 
matrix for demand node 4 constructed using Mathematica 10.2. 
Table 5-3: Possible Paths from Source Node to Demand Node 
Demand Node Possible Paths 
4 
{a,e,f}, {a,b,c}, {a,i,l,j,f}, {a,e,h,g,d}, {a,i,m,q,o,j,f}, {a,i,l,n,k,h,f}, 
{a,i,l,n,k,g,d}, {a,i,l,j,h,g,d}, {a,e,j,n,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,r,u,t,o,j,f}, 
{a,i,m,r,u,p,n,j,f}, {a,i,m,r,u,p,k,h,f}, {a,i,m,r,u,p,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,q,t,p,n,j,f}, 
{a,i,m,q,t,p,k,h,f}, {a,i,m,q,t,p,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,q,o,n,k,h,f}, 
{a,i,m,q,o,n,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,q,o,j,h,g,d}, {a,i,l,o,t,p,k,h,f}, {a,i,l,o,t,p,k,g,d}, 
{a,e,j,o,t,p,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,s,v,u,t,o,j,f}, {a,i,m,s,v,u,p,n,j,f}, 
{a,i,m,s,v,u,p,k,h,f}, {a,i,m,s,v,u,p,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,r,u,t,o,n,k,h,f}, 
{a,i,m,r,u,t,o,n,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,r,u,t,o,j,h,g,d}, {a,i,m,r,u,p,n,j,h,g,d}, 
{a,i,m,q,t,p,n,j,h,g,d}, {a,i,l,o,q,r,u,p,k,h,f}, {a,i,l,o,q,r,u,p,k,g,d}, 
{a,e,j,o,q,r,u,p,k,g,d}, {a,e,j,l,m,r,u,p,k,g,d}, {a,e,j,l,m,q,t,p,k,g,d}, 
{a,i,m,s,v,u,t,o,n,k,h,f}, {a,i,m,s,v,u,t,o,n,k,g,d}, {a,i,m,s,v,u,t,o,j,h,g,d}, 
{a,i,m,s,v,u,p,n,j,h,g,d}, {a,i,l,o,q,s,v,u,p,k,h,f}, {a,i,l,o,q,s,v,u,p,k,g,d}, 
{a,e,j,o,q,s,v,u,p,k,g,d}, {a,e,j,l,m,s,v,u,p,k,g,d} 
Table 5-4: Path Matrix of a Demand Node 
 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v 
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 




As discussed in research methodology, it is apparent from the path matrix that ‘a’ 
is a crucial segment, the failure of which will cause the failure of network (MATLAB 
R2013b). Hence it is recorded as a first order cut set. To find minimum cut sets of higher 
order, the columns in the path matrix are modified to represent the combination of two or 
more segments depending on the enumeration of required order of minimum cut sets. Using 
MATLAB R2013b, the number of combinations of two segments for the selected north 
phase sub-network are found to be 231. Hence the modified path matrix of demand node 4 
consists of 231 columns. 
 
Figure 5-5: Modified Path Matrix of Demand Node 
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The modified path matrix for combination of two segments indicates that there is 
not a single combination which causes the network failure by disconnecting the demand 
node as seemingly depicted in figure 5-5. Hence there are no second order cut sets recorded 
for the demand node 4. The modified path matrix for combination of 3 segments consists 
of 1540 columns representing 1540 combinations. Unlike the previous modified path 
matrix, it indicates that there are 6 third order cut sets as shown in figure 5-6. Represented 
by their column number, they are enumerated to be {b,d,f}, {b,e,i}, {b,f,g}, {c,d,f}, {c,e,i}, 
{c,f,g}. 
 
Figure 5-6: Modified Path Matrix of Demand Node 
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Correspondingly, the number of minimum cut sets are enumerated for all demand 
nodes in a similar fashion as enumerated for demand node 4. Table 5-5 displays the final 
list of minimum cut sets identified for all demand nodes while analyzing the north phase 
sub-network. Segment ‘a’ can be attributed as the most crucial segment in the north phase 
sub-network as it has been identified as the first order minimum cut set for all demand 
nodes. 
Table 5-5: Minimum Cut Sets for North Phase Sub-Network 




{b,d,f}, {b,e,i}, {b,f,g}, {c,d,f}, {c,e,i}, {c,f,g}, 
{d,h,k}, {g,h,k}, {i,j,k}, {i,l,m}, {k,n,p}, 
{m,q,u}, {o,q,t}, {p,t,u}, {r,s,u}, {r,u,v} 
Finally, applying the principle of minimum cut set method using equations 3-8 to 
3-12, the mechanical reliability of the north phase sub-network is calculated to be 0.9378. 
5.2.1.2 Hydraulic Reliability Model 
This model commences with importing the shape files of the selected sub network 
along with its attributes to Bentley WaterCAD (ArcMap 10.3.1; WaterCAD V8i) for the 
hydraulic simulation of a WDN in normal and failure conditions. Figure 5-7 portrays the 
hydraulic model of the selected north phase sub-network, the shape files of which are 
imported from ArcMap 10.3.1. The model is labeled with the GIS IDs of the components. 
Because of unavailability of hydraulic data for the valves and hydrants, they are assumed 
to aid in model implementation. The valves are assumed to be check valves with open 
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status whereas the demands for hydrants are added to the demands placed on nearest nodes. 
To add to model accuracy, these hydrant demands are obtained from Water Supply for 
Public Fire Protection (1999) - a practice guide prepared by Fire Underwriters Survey. As 
discussed in chapter 3, the accuracy of hydraulic simulation depends on how well the model 
is equipped with as much required data. 
 
Figure 5-7: North Phase Sub-Network Hydraulic Model (WaterCAD V8i) 
The next stage in this model is to allocate the demands at demand nodes. This is 
accomplished by using the unit demand control center tool in WaterCAD V8i. Note that 
the demand nodes are only those at junctions/intersections as per the definition of a 





Figure 5-8: Nodal Demand Allocation for North Phase Sub-Network (WaterCAD V8i) 
 




The nodal demand allocation marks the completion of equipping hydraulic model, 
and makes it ready for simulation. Figure 5-9 shows the running time for simulating the 
hydraulic model, and figure 5-10 depicts the simulated hydraulic model of the north phase 
sub network along with the direction of flow of water in normal condition. 
 
Figure 5-10: Hydraulic Simulation of North Phase Sub-Network (WaterCAD V8i) 
It is apparent from figure 5-10 that most of the water is flowed through segment 
‘a’. This confirms the earlier finding of segment ‘a’ to be most crucial segment while also 
explaining that the segment connecting the source of water delivery to the network is the 
most crucial segment in the whole network. Hence water utilities need to continuously 
monitor such segments in order to provide the water efficiently to consumers. 
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Table 5-6 illustrates the service pressure heads obtained through hydraulic 
simulation of the sub-network in normal condition. These pressure heads are required to 
satisfy the nodal demands. 
Table 5-6: Service Pressure Heads for Demand Nodes of North Phase Sub-Network 
Demand Node GIS ID Demand (m³/day) Pressure Head (m) 
8 N4210 114 34.86 
1 N5775 77.5 38.1 
4 N5794 93 35.71 
3 N5795 93 36 
2 N5796 114 38.5 
6 N5992 70 35.65 
5 N6088 93 32.38 
7 N6091 93 35.88 
12 N6094 152 34.94 
9 N6096 93 35.85 
10 N6098 84 34.65 
13 N6100 77.5 34.45 
11 N6108 95 36.5 
14 N6130 46.5 36.7 
15 N6131 77.5 36.39 
The hydraulic performance of a WDN is evaluated based on its ability to satisfy the 
nodal demands. To evaluate the actual demand received by consumers, the hydraulic model 
of the sub-network is simulated in failure condition for acquiring available pressure heads 
at nodes. Following the research methodology as discussed in chapter 3, the 
actual/available pressure heads at demand nodes are obtained through simulation in failure 
condition as shown in table 5-7. These pressure heads are then formulated with pressure 
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conditions using equations 3-13 to 3-16 for assessing the available demand at nodes as 
shown in table 5-8. 
Tables 5-7 and 5-8 depicts the available pressure heads and calculated nodal 
demands respectively for most of the identified cut sets but not all due to space 
insufficiency. Failure of segment ‘a’ disconnects the whole network from the source node, 
hence resulting in zero pressure head at all nodes except source node 1. 
Table 5-7: Available Pressure Head at Demand Nodes of North Phase Sub-Network 






































































































8 0 32.73 34.59 34.86 32.54 0 33.21 32.88 0 33.11 
1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 
4 0 32.69 35.94 35.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 36.16 36 0 0 0 38.29 22.5 38.18 
2 0 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 
6 0 33.31 35.7 35.65 33.59 0 33.99 33.95 0 34.08 
5 0 29.71 0 32.38 29.13 0 0 29.6 0 0 
7 0 33.56 35.56 35.88 33.28 0 34.07 33.67 0 33.95 
12 0 32.7 34.66 34.94 32.48 0 33.21 32.85 0 33.11 
9 0 33.61 35.57 35.85 33.41 0 34.12 33.78 0 34.03 
10 0 32.35 34.34 34.65 32.08 0 32.86 32.47 0 32.74 
13 0 32.21 34.16 34.45 31.98 0 32.71 32.35 0 32.61 
11 0 34.27 36.21 36.5 34.05 0 34.78 34.42 0 34.67 
14 0 34.47 36.41 36.7 34.25 0 34.97 34.62 0 34.87 
15 0 34.17 36.11 0 33.95 0 34.67 34.32 0 34.56 
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Apart from segment ‘a’, the combinations of segments {b,e,i} and {c,e,i} are also 
found to cause zero pressure heads indicating their cruciality in the sub-network. Hence 
water utilities need to constantly monitor them if any of these segments fails, in order to 
prevent network failure. Table 5-8 illustrates the available nodal demands which are 
calculated by comparing the available pressure heads with the required pressure heads at 
nodes. 
Table 5-8: Available Nodal Demands for North Phase Sub-Network 






































































































8 0 94.66 111.73 114.00 92.74 0.00 99.35 96.15 0.00 98.39 
1 77.5 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 77.50 
4 0 72.53 93.00 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0 0.00 93.00 93.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.00 0.00 93.00 
2 0 114.00 114.00 114.00 114.00 11.00 114.00 114.00 114.00 114.00 
6 0 58.32 70.00 70.00 59.84 0.00 61.94 61.73 0.00 62.40 
5 0 58.11 0.00 93.00 47.24 0.00 0.00 56.21 0.00 0.00 
7 0 78.12 91.09 93.00 76.13 0.00 81.62 78.89 0.00 80.81 
12 0 125.09 148.90 152.00 122.12 0.00 131.70 127.07 0.00 130.43 
9 0 78.62 91.33 93.00 77.21 0.00 82.12 79.80 0.00 81.51 
10 0 67.94 82.02 84.00 65.80 0.00 71.81 68.87 0.00 70.92 
13 0 62.61 75.74 77.50 60.88 0.00 66.23 63.65 0.00 65.52 
11 0 81.59 93.37 95.00 80.15 0.00 84.85 82.56 0.00 84.15 
14 0 40.10 45.72 46.50 39.41 0.00 41.62 40.56 0.00 41.32 
15 0 66.46 76.20 0.00 65.26 0.00 69.10 67.26 0.00 68.53 
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After finding the available demands at all nodes, the hydraulic reliability of the 
selected north phase sub-network is calculated using equations 3-17 and 3-18, which is 
found to be equal to 0.7062. 
5.2.1.3 Integrated Network Reliability 
The integrated mechanical and hydraulic reliability of a network/sub-network is 
evaluated based on the list of causes of failures as shown in table 2-1 which are proposed 
by NRC (2006) best practice guide for assessing and reducing risks in drinking water 
distribution systems. The information about the condition of a WDN and its components 
can be found from the operation and maintenance reports which contains the detailed 
information about the cause of a failure as recorded by the water utility. Due to lack of 
collection of such data, causes of failures are assumed and categorized in accordance with 
the total number of failures in the selected sub-network. 
 


































In entirety, the number of failures occurred in the selected north phase sub-network 
are 132. As proposed by NRC (2006) best practice guide, pipe deterioration is learned to 
be the cause for both mechanical and hydraulic failures and hence it is categorized 
separately. Total number of failures caused due to structural/mechanical reasons are 68 
which constitutes 51.51% of total failures, whereas hydraulic failures are enumerated to be 
64, constituting 48.49% of total failures in the sub-network. 
Using equation 3-19, the integrated reliability of the north phase sub-network is 
assessed to be equal to 0.8255. 
5.2.2 South Phase 
5.2.2.1 Mechanical Reliability Model 
Figure 5-12 represents the selected sub-network from south phase and table 5-9 
demonstrates the computed reliabilities and failure probabilities of its segments. 
 
Figure 5-12: South Phase Sub-Network Model (ArcMap 10.3.1) 
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Table 5-9: Segment Reliabilities and Failure Probabilities of South Phase Sub-Network 
Segment Segment Reliability Probability of failure of Segments 
a 0.9687 0.0313 
b 0.9762 0.0238 
c 0.9797 0.0203 
d 0.9946 0.0054 
e 0.9937 0.0063 
f 0.9913 0.0087 
g 0.9921 0.0079 
h 0.9912 0.0088 
i 0.9942 0.0058 
j 0.9942 0.0058 
k 0.9905 0.0095 
l 0.9893 0.0107 
m 0.9914 0.0086 
n 0.9889 0.0111 
o 0.9906 0.0094 
p 0.9831 0.0169 
q 0.9895 0.0105 
r 0.9870 0.0130 
From table 5-9, segment ‘a’ is observed to be the least reliable among all segments, 
and will be prior to other segments in scheduling rehabilitation. The reliability of most of 
the segments in the selected south phase sub-network is nearly 1, because their components 
are newer with less number of failures. Moreover, the reliability of segments in the south 
phase sub-network are found to be comparatively higher than those in north phase. The 
detailed comparison will be depicted in chapter 5.2.3. 
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Figure 5-13 depicts the south phase sub-network, constructed to analyze the 
network using minimum cut set method (Mathematica 10.2). Following the same procedure 
as applied for north phase sub-network, all the minimum cut sets are identified as shown 




Figure 5-13: South Phase Sub-Network Model (Mathematica 10.2) 
Table 5-10: Minimum Cut Sets for South Phase Sub-Network 
Order of Cut Sets List of Cut Sets 
1 {a} 
2 {b,d},{c,g},{n,q}, {p,r} 
3 
{b,c,e}, {b,e,g}, {b,f,i}, {c,d,e}, {c,h,l}, {d,e,g}, 
{d,f,i}, {g,h,l}, {i,j,l}, {i,k,n}, {i,k,q}, {l,m,p}, 
{l,m,r}, {n,o,p}, {n,o,r}, {o,p,q}, {o,q,r} 
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Applying the principle of minimum cut set method using equations 3-8 to 3-12, the 
mechanical reliability of the south phase sub-network is calculated to be 0.9680. 
5.2.2.2 Hydraulic Reliability Model 
Figure 5-14 portrays the hydraulic model of the selected north phase sub-network, 
the shape files of which are imported from ArcMap 10.3.1. The model is labeled with the 
GIS IDs of the components. 
 
Figure 5-14: South Phase Sub-Network Hydraulic Model (WaterCAD V8i) 
Following the methodology, the next step is to allocate the demands at demand 
nodes. Note that the demand nodes are only those at junctions/intersections as per the 
definition of a segment in this thesis. Figure 5-15 demonstrates the nodal demand allocation 
for the south phase sub-network. 
After nodal demand allocation, the hydraulic network is simulated to get the service 
pressure heads at nodes which are required to satisfy the demands placed on nodes. Figure 
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5-16 shows the running time for simulating the hydraulic model, and figure 5-17 depicts 
the simulated hydraulic model of the south phase sub network along with the direction of 
flow of water in normal condition. 
 
Figure 5-15: Nodal Demand Allocation for South Phase Sub-Network (WaterCAD V8i) 
 





Figure 5-17: Hydraulic Simulation of South Phase Sub-Network (WaterCAD V8i) 
It is apparent from figure 5-17 that most of the water is flowed through segment 
‘a’. This confirms the earlier finding from north phase sub-network that the segment 
connecting the source of water delivery to the network is the most crucial segment in the 
whole network. It should be noted that segment ‘a’ was also found to be the least reliable 
among all segments. Hence water utilities should constantly monitor such segments which 
are hydraulically crucial as well as mechanically weaker in order to provide the water 
adequately to consumers. 
Table 5-11 illustrates the service pressure heads obtained through hydraulic 
simulation of the sub-network in normal condition. These pressure heads are required to 
satisfy the nodal demands. 
The actual/available pressure heads at demand nodes obtained through simulation 
in failure condition are as shown in table 5-12 whereas the available demand at nodes are 
presented in table 5-13. 
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Table 5-11: Service Pressure Heads for Demand Nodes of South Phase Sub-Network 
Demand Node GIS ID Demand (m³/day) Pressure Head (m) 
10 N10333 70 39.56 
7 N11569 124 37.86 
4 N11570 62 34.55 
3 N11594 114 40.66 
2 N11596 57 43.59 
1 N11638 62 41.9 
11 N16836 77.5 43.06 
12 N16837 114 40.51 
13 N16839 133 39.94 
8 N16841 10 43.96 
5 N16844 114 43.29 
9 N16846 62 41.56 
6 N16849 76 41.09 
Table 5-12: Available Pressure Head at Demand Nodes of South Phase Sub-Network 




































































































10 0.00 0.00 39.48 39.56 39.56 38.91 38.92 0.00 0.00 39.44 
7 0.00 0.00 37.76 37.86 37.86 37.18 37.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.55 34.55 33.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 40.67 40.66 40.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.65 40.67 
2 0.00 43.59 43.59 43.59 43.59 43.59 43.59 43.59 43.59 43.59 
1 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 41.90 
11 0.00 0.00 42.97 0.00 43.05 42.41 42.43 0.00 0.00 42.94 
12 0.00 0.00 40.43 40.50 40.51 39.86 39.88 0.00 0.00 40.40 
13 0.00 0.00 39.86 39.93 0.00 39.29 39.31 0.00 0.00 39.83 
8 0.00 0.00 43.88 43.97 43.96 43.32 43.34 0.00 0.00 43.86 
5 0.00 0.00 43.22 43.29 43.29 42.73 42.74 43.02 0.00 43.22 
9 0.00 0.00 41.48 41.56 41.56 40.91 40.93 0.00 0.00 41.45 
6 0.00 0.00 41.01 41.09 41.09 40.42 40.44 0.00 0.00 41.02 
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Table 5-13: Available Nodal Demands for South Phase Sub-Network 




































































































10 0.00 0.00 69.76 70.00 70.00 68.00 68.03 0.00 0.00 69.64 
7 0.00 0.00 123.37 124.00 124.00 119.65 119.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 62.00 62.00 58.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 114.00 114.00 114.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 113.95 114.00 
2 0.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 57.00 
1 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 62.00 
11 0.00 0.00 77.27 0.00 77.47 75.81 75.86 0.00 0.00 77.19 
12 0.00 0.00 113.63 113.95 114.00 111.00 111.09 0.00 0.00 113.50 
13 0.00 0.00 132.55 132.94 0.00 129.33 129.44 0.00 0.00 132.39 
8 0.00 0.00 9.97 10.00 10.00 9.80 9.80 0.00 0.00 9.97 
5 0.00 0.00 113.74 114.00 114.00 111.89 111.93 112.99 0.00 113.74 
9 0.00 0.00 61.82 62.00 62.00 60.50 60.54 0.00 0.00 61.75 
6 0.00 0.00 75.77 76.00 76.00 74.03 74.09 0.00 0.00 75.80 
Based on the available pressure head at nodes as presented in table 5-12, segment 
‘a’ and the combined segments {b,d}, {b,f,i}, and {c,d,e} are observed to disconnect the 
network causing zero pressure heads at greater number of nodes. Hence these kind of 
segments or the segment combinations are the most crucial in the south phase network and 
need to be monitored constantly to prevent the network failure. Table 5-13 illustrates the 
available demands as a result of available pressure heads at nodes. 
After finding the available demands at all nodes, the hydraulic reliability of the 
selected north phase sub-network is calculated using equations 3-17 and 3-18, which is 
found to be equal to 0.6958. 
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5.2.2.3 Integrated Network Reliability 
As previously mentioned, the causes of failures are assumed and categorized in 
accordance with the total number of failures in the selected sub-network due to 
unavailability of such data. 
In entirety, the number of failures occurred in the selected south phase sub-network 
are 75. Total number of failures caused due to structural/mechanical reasons are 41 which 
constitutes 54.67% of total failures, whereas hydraulic failures are enumerated to be 34, 
constituting 45.33% of total failures in the sub-network. 
 
Figure 5-18: Causes of Failure in South Phase Sub-Network 
Using equation 3-19, the integrated reliability of the north phase sub-network is 































5.2.3 Comparison of Results 
The following observations/findings were recorded while implementing the 
developed research framework on the City of London. Two sub-networks having different 
sources of water were studied and the comparison of their results is presented herein. 
 
Figure 5-19: Comparison of Results 
1. The segment connecting the source of water to the network is the most crucial 
segment of the network. In both the sub-networks, segment ‘a’ is identified as a minimum 
cut set for all demand nodes. Moreover, segment ‘a’ is found to cause zero pressure heads 
at all demand nodes when the hydraulic models of both the sub-networks are simulated, 
confirming the stated finding. 
2. Although all the minimum cut sets are crucial segments in a network, few among 
them can be termed ‘more crucial’ than others. These segments/minimum cut sets are those 
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is run, indicating the effect/impact of disconnection caused by the minimum cut set. In the 
north phase sub-network, minimum cut sets {b,e,i} and {c,e,i} are identified to be most 
crucial whereas in south phase, {b,d}, {b,f,i} and {c,d,e} are found to be the most crucial 
segments/minimum cut sets than others. 
3. From figure 5-19, the following comparisons are drawn. 
(i) The average reliability of the component in the south phase sub-network is found 
greater than the north phase. This can be attributed to the age of components and 
relatively less number of failures in the network. 
(ii) The newer components in the south phase sub-network results in greater 
average reliability of segments in the south phase. 
(iii) The mechanical reliability of the south phase sub-network is calculated to be 
greater than the north phase, representing higher structural efficiency. This is 
because of the components encompassing the south phase sub-network, which are 
relatively new and has less number of failures. 
(iv) Albeit the south phase sub-network consists of newer components than the 
north phase, the hydraulic reliability of both the networks is found to be nearly 
equal. This is because the demand nodes in north phase are strongly connected i.e. 
they have more alternate ways of receiving water in case of a segment failure, hence 
the impact of failure is less than that in the south phase. This explains that the 




(v) The integrated network reliability indicates that the south phase sub-network is 
more reliable. Therefore, the north phase sub-network takes the priority when 
scheduling the rehabilitation. 
 
Figure 5-20: Comparison of Required Pressure Heads 
4. From figure 5-20, it is evident that the south phase sub-network requires higher 
pressure than the north phase, to supply equal demands of water. The main rationale behind 
this is explained by the elevation profile of both networks (Provided in Appendix). 
(i) The south phase sub-network is geographically located at a higher elevation than 
the source of water, and hence require higher pressure to supply the required water 
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(ii) Whereas the north phase sub-network is located geographically at lower 
elevation than its source of water, and hence require less pressure than the south 
phase to supply the required demand at nodes. The water can be reached to the north 
phase by the action of gravity, and hardly requires any pumping operation. 
5.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis is performed to study (1) the behavior of pipes with 
different lengths, and (2) the behavior of pipes with different diameters in north and south 
phases throughout their useful life. In the first case, the mechanical reliability of pipes is 
computed by keeping all the properties of network as constant except age and length. The 
computation is performed for pipes with varying lengths and the curves are constructed to 
represent their mechanical behavior as they deteriorate with age. 
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From figure 5-21, it is apparent that the shorter length pipes are mechanically more 
reliable than longer length pipes. It is observed that the 20m length pipe tend to fail earlier 
than 5m, 10m and 15m length pipes. Similarly, pipe of 15m length fails earlier than 10m 
and 5m pipes. This is because as the length of pipe increases, the failure tendency of a pipe 
increases, increasing the number of breaks and hence failure rate. 
For the latter case, the constructed hydraulic models of both sub-networks are 
simulated in normal condition by keeping all the properties of network as constant except 
C factor and diameter. C factor is a numerical constant (namely Hazen William’s 
Coefficient) which represents the amount of tuberculation in the pipe. As the pipe ages, it 
gets tuberculated reducing the value of C factor. Hence it is chosen as an indicator to 
represent the change in age of pipe. 
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The same diameter pipe is simulated in normal condition by changing the C factor 
each time gradually reducing its value until the network fails hydraulically and in each 
case, the hydraulic reliability of the network is recorded. The procedure is repeated for 
different diameter pipes and the curves are constructed to represent their hydraulic behavior 
throughout their useful life using values of recorded hydraulic reliability. 
From figure 5-22, it is apparent that the small diameter pipes are less reliable than 
larger diameter pipes. In both sub-networks, pipes with 150mm diameter tend to fail earlier 
than 200mm and 250mm. Similarly, pipes with 200mm diameter fails earlier than 250mm. 
This is because as the pipe ages, it gets more and more tuberculated and reduces the actual 
diameter of pipes resisting the flow of water through them. However, it should be noted 
that as the diameter of pipe gets increased, the failure tendency gets reduced and the pipes 
behave likewise. It can also be observed from figure 5-22 that the pipes with same diameter 
hydraulically performs better in south phase sub-network in normal condition conforming 
the earlier finding that the network encompassed with newer components is more reliable. 
5.3 City of Doha 
The developed model is also implemented on a sub-network of Qatar University, 
selected from the City of Doha as shown in figure 5-22. The location of demand nodes are 
assumed to aid in model implementation, and their respective elevation are derived using 
Google Earth Pro software. Based on these demand nodes, 14 segments are identified 




Figure 5-23: Qatar University Sub-Network Model (ArcMap 10.3.1) 
5.3.1 Mechanical Reliability Model 
Table 5-14 depicts the calculated reliability and failure probability of identified 
segments. The results reflect that the selected sub-network is newly constructed and has 




Table 5-14: Segment Reliabilities and Failure Probabilities of Qatar University Sub-Network 
Segment Segment Reliability Probability of failure of Segments 
a 0.9944 0.0056 
b 0.9952 0.0048 
c 0.9931 0.0069 
d 0.9942 0.0058 
e 0.9943 0.0057 
f 0.9950 0.0050 
g 0.9926 0.0074 
h 0.9938 0.0062 
i 0.9949 0.0051 
j 0.9946 0.0054 
k 0.9957 0.0043 
l 0.9958 0.0042 
m 0.9946 0.0054 




Figure 5-24: Qatar University Sub-Network Model (Mathematica 10.2) 
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Figure 5-23 depicts the selected Qatar University sub-network, constructed to 
analyze the network using minimum cut set method (Mathematica 10.2). Following the 
same procedure as applied for previous sub-networks, all the minimum cut sets are 
identified as shown in table 5-15. The highest order of cut set identified is two, and hence 
there are no third order cut sets. 
Table 5-15: Minimum Cut Sets for Qatar University Sub-Network 
Order of Cut Sets List of Cut Sets 
1 {a}, {b}, {c}, {g}, {j} 
2 
{d,e}, {d,f}, {d,h}, {d,i}, {d,k}, {d,l}, {d,m}, 
{d,n}, {e,f}, {e,h}, {e,i}, {e,k}, {e,l}, {e,m}, 
{e,n}, {f,h}, {f,i}, {f,k}, {f,l}, {f,m}, {f,n}, {h,i}, 
{h,k}, {h,l}, {h,m}, {h,n}, {i,k}, {i,l}, {i,m}, 
{i,n}, {k,l}, {k,m}, {k,n}, {l,m}, {l,n}, {m,n} 
Applying the principle of minimum cut set method using equations 3-8 to 3-12, the 
mechanical reliability of the Qatar University sub-network is calculated to be 0.9689. 
5.3.2 Hydraulic Reliability Model 
Figure 5-24 portrays the hydraulic model of the sub-network currently under 
consideration, and is labeled with the GIS IDs of the components whereas figure 5-25 
demonstrates the nodal demand allocation. Note that, the total demand is calculated using 
the unit demand control center tool and is distributed among all nodes. Also, an additional 




Figure 5-25: Qatar University Hydraulic Model (WaterCAD V8i) 
After nodal demand allocation, the hydraulic network is simulated to get the service 
pressure heads at nodes which are required to satisfy the demands placed on nodes. Figure 
5-26 depicts the simulated hydraulic model of the Qatar University sub network along with 




Figure 5-26: Nodal Demand Allocation for Qatar University Sub-Network  
(WaterCAD V8i) 
 
Figure 5-27: Hydraulic Simulation of Qatar University Sub-Network (WaterCAD V8i) 
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Figure 5-26 conforms to the observation made in previous sub-networks that the 
segment connecting the source of water to the network is the most crucial segment and 
need to be monitored constantly. Table 5-16 illustrates the service pressure heads obtained 
through hydraulic simulation of the sub-network in normal condition. These pressure heads 
are required to satisfy the nodal demands. 
Table 5-16: Service Pressure Heads for Demand Nodes of Qatar University Sub-Network 
Demand Node GIS ID Demand (m³/day) Pressure Head (m) 
2 J-15 108.00 29.91 
7 J-16 106.00 16.85 
3 J-18 114.00 27.41 
10 J-20 138.00 16.85 
4 J-48 126.00 28.90 
8 J-51 144.00 16.85 
11 J-53 102.00 17.34 
6 J-77 134.00 15.87 
13 J-85 132.00 22.86 
5 J-88 120.00 20.87 
9 J-96 96.00 17.85 
1 J-101 132.00 28.00 
12 J-115 108.00 17.86 
14 J-126 120.00 23.87 
The actual/available pressure heads at demand nodes obtained through simulation 
in failure condition are as shown in table 5-17. These pressure heads are then formulated 
with pressure conditions using equations 3-13 to 3-16, for which the minimum and 
maximum pressure heads are assumed as 10m and 40m respectively for assessing the 
available demand at nodes. These assumptions are required to aid in model implementation 
due to lack of design data availability. 
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Table 5-17: Available Pressure Head at Demand Nodes of Qatar University Sub-Network 


















































































2 0.00 29.91 29.99 29.92 29.91 29.91 29.92 29.92 29.93 29.95 
7 0.00 16.85 0.00 16.87 16.86 16.69 16.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.00 27.49 27.41 27.41 27.41 27.42 27.42 27.42 27.44 
10 0.00 16.85 0.00 16.87 16.86 16.71 16.76 16.81 16.84 0.00 
4 0.00 28.90 0.00 28.91 28.90 28.90 28.91 28.91 28.92 28.94 
8 0.00 16.85 0.00 0.00 16.86 16.69 16.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 0.00 17.34 0.00 17.35 0.00 17.19 17.24 17.29 17.33 0.00 
6 0.00 15.87 0.00 15.88 15.87 15.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 0.00 22.86 0.00 22.88 22.87 22.77 22.81 22.84 22.86 22.91 
5 0.00 20.87 0.00 20.89 20.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 0.00 17.85 0.00 17.87 17.86 17.70 17.75 17.80 0.00 0.00 
1 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 
12 0.00 17.86 0.00 17.87 17.86 17.74 17.78 17.82 17.85 17.91 
14 0.00 23.87 0.00 23.88 23.87 23.80 23.83 23.85 23.87 23.91 
From table 5-17, segments ‘a’ and ‘c’ and the combined segments {d,h}, {d,i}, and 
{d,k} are observed to disconnect the network causing zero pressure heads at greater number 
of nodes. Hence these kind of segments or the segment combinations need to be monitored 
constantly to prevent the network failure. Table 5-18 illustrates the available demands as a 
result of available pressure heads at nodes. 
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Table 5-18: Available Nodal Demands for Qatar University Sub-Network 

















































































2 0 108 108 108 108 108.00 108.00 108.00 108.00 108 
7 0 106 0 106 106 104.75 105.22 0.00 0.00 0 
3 0 0 114 114 114 114.00 114.00 114.00 114.00 114 
10 0 138 0 138 138 136.58 137.09 137.60 137.90 0 
4 0 126 0 126 126 126.00 126.00 126.00 126.00 126 
8 0 144 0 0 140 142.31 142.95 0.00 0.00 0 
11 0 102 0 102 0 100.95 101.30 101.65 101.93 0 
6 0 134 0 134 134 131.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
13 0 132 0 132 132 131.54 131.74 131.90 132.00 132 
5 0 120 0 120 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
9 0 96 0 96 96 95.08 95.39 95.69 0.00 0 
1 132 132 132 132 132 132.00 132.00 132.00 132.00 132 
12 0 108 0 108 108 107.17 107.45 107.72 107.93 108 
14 0 120 0 120 120 119.70 119.83 119.91 120.00 120 
After finding the available demands at all nodes, the hydraulic reliability of the 
Qatar University sub-network is evaluated using equations 3-17 and 3-18, which is found 
to be equal to 0.6775. 
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5.3.3 Integrated Network Reliability 
As discussed earlier, the causes of failures are assumed and categorized in 
accordance with the total number of failures in the selected sub-network due to 
unavailability of such data. 
In entirety, the number of failures occurred in the Qatar University sub-network are 
55. Total number of failures caused due to structural/mechanical reasons are 32 which 
constitutes 58.18% of total failures, whereas hydraulic failures are enumerated to be 23, 
constituting 41.82% of total failures in the sub-network. 
 
Figure 5-28: Causes of Failure in Qatar University Sub-Network 
Using equation 3-19, the integrated reliability of the north phase sub-network is 



































In this chapter, the developed research framework is implemented on two case 
studies to demonstrate its exploitation. In the first case study, two sub-networks are selected 
based on their source of water supply and their corresponding data are extracted from 
ArcGIS. At first, the failure rate of all components is computed to aid in the evaluation of 
their reliabilities. Furthermore, the reliability and failure probability of segments is 
evaluated based on their components’ composition. With failure probabilities of segments 
known, the following step is to perform minimum cut set analysis for evaluating 
mechanical reliability. For this purpose, the selected sub-network is constructed in 
Mathematica 10.2 and analyzed to derive path matrices of all demand nodes. These path 
matrices are modified in accordance with segment combinations to identify and enumerate 
all minimum cut sets, based on the formulation of which mechanical reliability of the sub-
network is assessed. 
After determining the mechanical reliability, the hydraulic model is constructed in 
WaterCAD V8i simulation engine by importing the shape files of the sub-network. The 
hydraulic model is then equipped with all the required data for the hydraulic simulation of 
a WDN in normal and failure conditions. The simulation results aid in obtaining the 
required as well as actual pressure head at demand nodes. The model is then formulated 
with pressure conditions to evaluate the available demand at demand nodes which in 
contrast to the required demand aids in predicting the hydraulic reliability of the sub 
network. Finally, the sub-network is assessed for integrated mechanical and hydraulic 
reliability based on failure causes. 
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The results of two sub-networks selected from the City of London, are compared 
to discuss the findings and draw the observations found common between them with the 
help of graphs. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is performed to study the behavior of pipe 
with contrasting diameters in different sub-networks throughout their useful life. The 
chapter concludes by extending the implementation of developed model to a sub-network 




CHAPTER 6  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Summary 
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are complex interconnected networks that 
require extensive planning and maintenance to ensure good quality water is delivered to all 
consumers. They are vital part of urban infrastructure and require high investment, 
operation and maintenance costs. The main task of a WDN is to provide consumers with a 
minimum acceptable level of supply (in terms of pressure, availability, and water quality) 
at all times under a range of operating conditions (Mohammed et al., 2015). However, the 
water infrastructure in North America signifies an urgent need of upgrading the aging and 
deteriorating distribution systems if they are to continue to provide consumers with reliable 
and safe water supplies. In this context, this research is proposing a new reliability model 
for assessing the structural as well as hydraulic condition of a WDN to identify failure-
prone components and prioritize their renewal. 
The developed methodology is encompassed by the modeling aspects of 
mechanical reliability, hydraulic reliability, and integrated reliability assessment. The first 
model commences with the computation of the failure rate of all components which aid in 
the evaluation of their reliabilities. Proceeding further, the reliability and failure probability 
of segments is evaluated based on their components’ composition. At this stage, the 
segments can be prioritized for rehabilitation based on their reliability. With failure 
probabilities of segments known, the following step is to perform minimum cut set analysis 
for the purpose of which the selected sub-network is constructed in Mathematica 10.2 and 
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analyzed to derive path matrices of all demand nodes. These path matrices are modified in 
accordance with segment combinations to identify and enumerate all minimum cut sets, 
based on the formulation of which mechanical reliability of the sub-network is assessed. 
To facilitate this tedious process, it has been coded in MATLAB R2013b programming 
environment along with the utilization of Wolfram Mathematica 10.2 and Microsoft Excel 
2013. 
After determining the mechanical reliability, the second model is initiated in an 
attempt to assess the hydraulic reliability of the sub-network. Aspired by this, the hydraulic 
model is constructed in WaterCAD V8i simulation engine by importing the shape files of 
the sub-network. The hydraulic model is then equipped with all the required data about 
components for the hydraulic simulation of a WDN in normal and failure conditions, the 
results of which aid in obtaining the required as well as actual pressure head at demand 
nodes. The model is then formulated with pressure conditions to calculate the available 
demand at demand nodes which in contrast to the required demand aids in predicting the 
hydraulic reliability of the sub network. Finally, the sub-network is assessed for integrated 
mechanical and hydraulic reliability based on types of failure causes. The integrated 
reliability of different sub-networks are then employed in prioritizing their rehabilitation. 
Two case studies are presented to demonstrate the application of the developed 
framework and its expected contributions using data obtained from the Cities of London, 




Following conclusions can be inferred from the development and implementation 
of proposed reliability model. 
1. The mechanical reliability of a network encompassed by newer components with 
less number of failures is greater than that of other networks. It was found 0.9378 
for the north phase and 0.9680 for the south phase sub-networks, representing the 
south phase as newer than north phase. 
2. The structure/configuration of the network also plays an important role in affecting 
the overall network reliability. The hydraulic reliability of selected sub-networks 
from the City of London are found almost equal albeit the south phase sub-network 
is relatively new as compared to the north phase, conforming the current 
conclusion.  
3. The elevation profile of the network affects its hydraulic performance. It is deduced 
by comparing the north and south phase sub-networks’ pressure heads that are 
required for supplying equivalent demands of water. It is observed that the south 
phase sub-network is geographically located at a higher elevation than the source 
of water, and hence require higher pressure to supply the required water demand at 
nodes.  
4. The segment connecting the source of water to the network is identified as the most 
crucial segment of the network. The failure of this segment disconnects the whole 
network from the source causing zero pressure heads at all demand nodes. The 
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results of minimum cut set analysis and the hydraulic simulation of selected sub-
networks from both case studies provides a testimony to this conclusion. 
5. Although all the minimum cut sets are crucial segments in a network, few among 
them can be termed ‘more crucial’ than others. These segments/minimum cut sets 
are those which cause zero pressure heads at most of the demand nodes when 
hydraulic simulation is run, indicating the effect/impact of disconnection caused by 
the minimum cut set. In the north phase sub-network, minimum cut sets {b,e,i} and 
{c,e,i} are identified to be most crucial whereas in south phase, {b,d}, {b,f,i} and 
{c,d,e} are found to be the most crucial segments/minimum cut sets than others. 
6. The integrated network reliability of sub-networks decides the priority of their 
rehabilitation in a network. The results indicate that the south phase sub-network is 
more reliable. Therefore, the north phase sub-network takes the priority when 
scheduling the rehabilitation. 
6.3 Research Contributions 
The most significant contributions towards this research are listed as follows: 
1. The reliability indices are provided at hierarchical levels of component, segment 
and network. This provides a room for prioritizing rehabilitation at all levels. 
2. An integrated model is developed for assessing segment reliability based on its 
composition of pipes and accessories. 
3. The algorithm of minimum cut set analysis of a network is extended to identify the 
minimum cut sets for all demand nodes i.e. to identify the pipes the failure of which 
will cause disconnection, for all demand nodes. 
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4. The process of analyzing a water distribution network for its mechanical reliability 
evaluation is automated to curtail its tediousness. It is coded in MATLAB R2013b 
programming environment along with the utilization of Wolfram Mathematica 10.2 
and Microsoft Excel 2013. 
5. The hydraulic reliability of a water distribution network is evaluated considering 
the effect of pressure in achieving required demands of water. Moreover, the 
hydraulic performance is evaluated based on simulation which improves its 
accuracy. 
6. An integrated reliability assessment model is developed to evaluate the overall 
condition of a water distribution network accounting for structural as well as 
hydraulic performances. 
6.4 Research Limitations 
The developed methodology possesses some limitations which are summarized in 
the following list: 
1. The proposed model requires a detailed historic break data of all the components 
including pipes. But many municipalities are not equipped to collect such detailed 
data. 
2. The failure rate of pipes is computed based only on their age even though the failure 
can occur due to one or more factors such as the diameter, weather condition and 
the surrounding soil condition. 
3. The reliability is assessed over the useful life of components without taking into 
consideration the effect of rehabilitation. 
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4. The accuracy of the hydraulic model depends on the accuracy of the data used to 
build it. It requires detailed attributes of components encompassing a water 
distribution network. 
5. The hydraulic reliability is based on nodal demands that are calculated for an instant 
point of time whereas in reality, the demands change over a period of time affecting 
the hydraulic performance of a network. 
6. An automated tool is not provided for implementing and validating the developed 
model. Rather the model is automated using coded scripts. 
6.5 Recommendations for Future Work 
Although the developed methodology has achieved the objective of this research in 
the form of integrated reliability assessment model, it still has some room for improvement. 
The recommendations for possible future work are summarized in two categories as 
follows: 
6.5.1 Research Enhancement 
1. Consider more factors to compute the failure rate of pipes. The failure rate 
prediction can be made more realistic by considering effective factors such as soil 
condition and diameter. 
2. Develop a failure rate prediction model for water distribution network components 
other than pipes. It will enhance the computation of segment reliability and 
ultimately improves the accuracy of network reliability evaluation. 
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3. Enhance the developed model by considering the effect of rehabilitation. The 
reliability of water mains increase when they are rehabilitated. Therefore develop 
a dynamic reliability index to cover the properties of components throughout their 
lifecycle. 
4. Develop a criticality model for studying the relation among different factors 
affecting the water main condition, and combine with the reliability model to 
prioritize the rehabilitation more accurately. 
5. Investigate the nodal demands over a period of time for identifying the demand 
multipliers to consider running the hydraulic simulation in extended period mode. 
6. Develop an automated tool for exploiting the developed research framework in 
implementing and validating the model. It will facilitate the users in employing this 
method without requiring them to perform enormous calculations. 
6.5.2 Research Extension 
1. The integrated reliability assessment model can be extended to also account for the 
evaluation of reliability related to water quality. This will eventually form a model 
than can predict all quantitative and qualitative aspects of a water distribution 
infrastructure. 
2. The developed model can be supplemented with rehabilitation scheduling, budget 
allocation and life cycle cost models, ultimately forming a complete water assets 
management tool.  
3. Moreover, the developed model can be integrated with reliability prediction models 
of sewer and road infrastructure by exploring and understanding interdependencies 
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among them. This will aid the municipalities to have a comprehensive overview of 
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APPENDIX A: Data Collection 
Components Data of Selected Sub-Networks
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Pipe 1 L10500 0 84 153.33 100 
N5775 N5796 
CI 25 - - 
Valve 1 V10122 N.A N.A N.A 100 N.A N.A 478566.094 4761372 
b 
Pipe 1 L10477 0 2 189.03 150 
N5796 N5795 
CI 30 - - 
Valve 1 V4972 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478741.688 4761409 
Hydrant 1 H4286 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478737.562 4761405.5 
c 
Pipe 1 L10479 0 93 117.97 150 
N5795 N5794 
CI 31 - - 
Valve 1 V1961 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478757.125 4761402.5 
d 
Pipe 1 L10419 0 91 113.78 150 
N5794 N6088 
CI 32 - - 
Valve 1 V2558 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478830.094 4761210 
e 
Pipe 1 L10183 0 84 4.92 150 
N5796 N5992 
CI 34 - - 
Pipe 2 L10478 0 84 113.81 150 CI 34 - - 
Valve 1 V4422 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478579.062 4761333.5 
f 
Pipe 1 L10184 0 72 190.56 150 
N5990 N5794 
CI 40 - - 
Valve 1 V6108 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478781.219 4761295.5 
Valve 2 V10357 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A - - 
Hydrant 1 H8101 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478780.125 4761293.5 
g 
Pipe 1 L12929 0 96 164.14 150 
N6091 N6088 
CI 31 - - 
Pipe 2 L12930 0 24 4.38 200 PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 3 L12931 0 24 21.57 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V2196 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478830.219 4761194.5 
Valve 2 V8929 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 478681.031 4761138.5 
Hydrant 1 H4408 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478768.5 4761175.5 
h 
Pipe 1 L10115 0 91 112.52 150 
N5990 N6091 
CI 32 - - 
Valve 1 V2573 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478650.188 4761149 




Pipe 1 L10476 0 16 1.90 150 
N5796 N4210 
CI 30 - - 
Pipe 2 L12937 0 2 145.36 150 CI 30 - - 
Pipe 3 L12935 0 24 128.52 150 DI 120 - - 
Valve 1 V2686 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478567.188 4761342.5 
Hydrant 1 H4287 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478561.781 4761338.5 
Hydrant 2 H3614 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478425.594 4761288.5 
j 
Pipe 1 L10348 0 67 271.75 150 
N6096 N5992 
CI 43 - - 
Valve 1 V4377 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478608.031 4761236 
k 
Pipe 1 L12934 0 25 272.11 200 
N6098 N6091 
PVC 130 - - 
Hydrant 1 H3615 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478642.25 4761126.5 
Hydrant 2 H3616 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478532.906 4761085.5 
Hydrant 3 H3617 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478429.125 4761046.5 
l 
Pipe 1 L12938 0 24 6.10 150 
N4210 N6096 
DI 120 - - 
Pipe 2 L10345 2 67 115.83 150 CI 45 - - 
Valve 1 V563 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478324.312 4761240.5 
Hydrant 1 H8117 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478355.438 4761155 
m 
Pipe 1 L12939 0 24 1.40 150 
N4210 N6108 
DI 120 - - 
Pipe 2 L12940 0 24 16.40 100 DI 120 - - 
Pipe 3 L12941 0 60 99.21 150 CI 47 - - 
Pipe 4 L10305 2 62 131.26 150 CI 47 - - 
Valve 1 V11024 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478221.062 4761213 
Valve 2 V13360 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478201.344 4761182.5 
Hydrant 1 H4399 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478295 4761238.5 
Hydrant 2 H4410 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478181.75 4761090 
n 
Pipe 1 L10316 0 65 116.03 150 
N6096 N6098 
CI 45 - - 
Valve 1 V9052 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478398.844 4761044.5 
o 
Pipe 1 L10314 0 62 93.20 150 
N6094 N6096 
CI 47 - - 
Valve 1 V2612 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478355.594 4761139.5 
p 
Pipe 1 L12933 0 25 5.52 200 
N6100 N6098 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L12932 0 91 89.43 150 CI 32 - - 
Valve 1 V11653 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 478398.156 4761032 
q 
Pipe 1 L10309 0 60 28.00 150 
N6108 N6094 
CI 49 - - 
Pipe 2 L10303 0 56 73.10 150 CI 53 - - 
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Valve 1 V3388 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478185.375 4761075.5 
r 
Pipe 1 L10301 1 62 13.78 150 
N6108 N6130 
CI 47 - - 
Pipe 2 L10307 2 62 114.45 150 CI 47 - - 
Valve 1 V7829 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478214.719 4760979.5 
s 
Pipe 1 L20466 0 47 211.20 150 
N6131 N6108 
DI 120 - - 
Valve 1 V11217 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478161.719 4761081.5 
Valve 2 V5677 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478096.656 4760937 
Valve 3 V5847 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478101.469 4760924 
Hydrant 1 H4411 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 478095.469 4761023.5 
t 
Pipe 1 L10318 0 70 114.59 150 
N6100 N6094 
CI 41 - - 
Valve 1 V6649 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 478308.344 4761017 
u 
Pipe 1 L10311 0 91 100.74 150 
N6130 N6100 
CI 32 - - 
Hydrant 1 H2830 N.A N.A N.A   N.A N.A 478246.5 4760978.222 
v 
Pipe 1 L10274 0 91 28.39 150 
N6131 N6130 
CI 32 - - 
Pipe 2 L10272 0 89 97.06 150 CI 32 - - 
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a Pipe 1 L2605 0 44 32.76 300 N11638 N11596 DI 120 - - 
b 
Pipe 1 L2607 1 44 146.29 300 
N11596 N11594 
DI 120 - - 
Valve 1 V8333 N.A N.A N.A 300 N.A N.A 480634.812 4754736 
c 
Pipe 1 L2665 0 44 148.4 300 
N11594 N11570 
DI 120 - - 
Hydrant 1 H6967 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480623.094 4754754.5 
d 
Pipe 1 L21485 0 11 250.031 200 
N16844 N11596 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L20796 0 12 17.72 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V15500 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480658.419 4754608.88 
Valve 2 V14987 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480907.306 4754638.34 
Hydrant 1 H10685 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480772.303 4754628.253 
Hydrant 2 H10686 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480670.482 4754616.197 
e 
Pipe 1 L21484 0 11 252.097 200 
N16849 N11594 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L20803 0 12 15.822 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V15499 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480632.565 4754752.863 
Valve 2 V14994 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480883.46 4754782.486 
Hydrant 1 H10684 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480753.861 4754773.078 
f 
Pipe 1 L20797 0 12 7.61 200 
N16844 N16849 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L21480 0 11 125.965 200 PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 3 L20805 0 12 13.518 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14988 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480922.385 4754646.27 
Valve 2 V14996 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480899.704 4754772.333 
g 
Pipe 1 L13129 0 23 267.1 200 
N11570 N11569 
PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V209 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480857.312 4754928.5 
Valve 2 V7987 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480607.812 4754899 
Hydrant 1 H3556 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480739.344 4754917.5 
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Hydrant 2 H3555 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480851.562 4754930.5 
h 
Pipe 1 L21481 0 11 144.616 200 
N16849 N11569 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L20804 0 12 4.306 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V15497 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480874.581 4754913.868 
Valve 2 V14995 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480897.205 4754786.941 
i 
Pipe 1 L20795 0 12 280.12 200 
N16841 N16844 
PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14986 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481190.849 4754671.943 
Hydrant 1 H10408 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481105.63 4754666.725 
Hydrant 2 H10409 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480930.466 4754647.118 
j 
Pipe 1 L20802 0 12 279.223 200 
N16846 N16849 
PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14993 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481167.192 4754816.233 
Hydrant 1 H10412 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481081.125 4754810.588 
Hydrant 2 H10413 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 480905.615 4754791.201 
k 
Pipe 1 L20801 0 12 16.07 200 
N16841 N16846 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L21474 0 11 123.345 200 PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 3 L20793 0 12 8.012 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14992 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481177.327 4754803.239 
Valve 2 V14984 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481200.491 4754679.633 
Hydrant 1 H10680 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481192.148 4754748.281 
l 
Pipe 1 L13130 0 23 272.56 200 
N11569 N10333 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L13131 0 23 8.71 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V8155 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 480877.312 4754931 
Hydrant 1 H3554 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481013.75 4754949.5 
m 
Pipe 1 L21475 0 11 141.482 200 
N16846 N10333 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L20800 0 12 6.85 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V15493 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481153.779 4754947.475 
Valve 2 V14991 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481173.934 4754823.077 
Hydrant 1 H10681 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481167.008 4754895.658 
n 
Pipe 1 L20792 0 12 270.032 200 
N16836 N16841 
PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14983 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481468.025 4754704.8 
Hydrant 1 H10406 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481462.219 4754710.373 
Hydrant 2 H10407 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481283.991 4754687.155 
o Pipe 1 L20799 0 12 272.089 200 N16837 N16846 PVC 130 - - 
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Valve 1 V14990 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481443.286 4754849.071 
Hydrant 1 H10410 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481436.474 4754854.037 
Hydrant 2 H10411 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481259.711 4754833.226 
p 
Pipe 1 L13132 0 23 199 200 
N10333 N16839 
PVC 130 - - 
Pipe 2 L13128 0 62 64.59 150 CI 47 - - 
Pipe 3 L20791 0 12 6.626 200 PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V5202 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481345.625 4754984 
Valve 2 V5707 N.A N.A N.A 150 N.A N.A 481414.219 4754994.5 
Hydrant 1 H3553 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 481252.375 4754978 
q 
Pipe 1 L20788 0 12 146.371 200 
N16836 N16837 
PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14981 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481469.535 4754706.22 
r 
Pipe 1 L20789 0 12 152.954 200 
N16837 N16839 
PVC 130 - - 
Valve 1 V14982 N.A N.A N.A 200 N.A N.A 481444.911 4754850.579 
































































































Pipe 1 P110440 0 8 14.34 400 
J-101 J-15 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P111886 0 8 5.60 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P111222 1 8 18.85 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P111221 0 8 20.11 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P112177 1 8 38.20 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P110535 0 8 3.96 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 P111267 0 8 3.93 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 P109984 0 8 2.28 400 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 P110178 1 8 11.23 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 10 P110460 0 8 12.34 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 11 P111689 0 8 16.74 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 12 WM-329959 0 8 289.54 300 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021462 1 8 N.A 300 N.A N.A 228,162.80 401,495.53 
Hydrant 1 HD-128512 0 3 N.A N.A N.A N.A 228,161.29 401,498.99 
b 
Pipe 1 WM-348467 0 4 51.61 300 
J-15 J-18 
HDPE 130 - - 
Pipe 2 WM-333799 0 4 1.21 300 HDPE 130 - - 
Pipe 3 WM-333801 0 4 1.74 250 HDPE 130 - - 
Pipe 4 WM-333802 0 4 10.48 250 HDPE 130 - - 
Pipe 5 WM-329869 0 8 0.49 250 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 WM-329961 0 8 0.69 150 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 WM-348918 0 4 0.38 150 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 WM-348919 1 4 6.23 150 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 WM-348920 1 4 54.41 150 HDPE 130 - - 
Pipe 10 WM-348921 0 4 1.70 150 HDPE 130 - - 
Pipe 11 WM-333694 0 4 13.04 150 HDPE 130 - - 
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Valve 1 SV-72405 1 4 N.A 150 N.A N.A 228,015.94 401,749.26 
Valve 2 SV-72397 1 4 N.A 300 N.A N.A 228,016.00 401,750.72 
Valve 3 SV-72406 1 4 N.A 300 N.A N.A 228,015.43 401,751.49 
Valve 4 SV-72407 0 4 N.A 250 N.A N.A 228,014.39 401,752.24 
c 
Pipe 1 P111651 1 8 18.53 300 
J-23 J-48 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P110133 0 8 5.13 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P110046 0 8 1.23 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P111625 0 8 8.38 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P112334 1 8 8.64 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P110973 1 8 16.54 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 P111751 0 8 3.30 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 WM-329962 0 8 8.13 300 DI 130 - - 
Hydrant 1 H011715 1 8 N.A N.A N.A N.A 228,009.67 401,766.46 
d 
Pipe 1 P112024 0 8 4.54 300 
J-48 J-88 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P110915 1 8 4.93 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P110945 1 8 340.52 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P110254 1 8 32.32 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P110249 0 8 23.23 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P111329 0 8 34.04 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 P112123 0 8 5.42 300 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021170 1 8 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,957.22 401,785.94 
e 
Pipe 1 P111749 0 8 40.20 300 
J-88 J-77 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P111550 0 8 118.86 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P111122 0 8 2.65 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P110396 0 8 98.09 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P110830 0 8 1.51 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P111488 0 8 3.60 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 P110624 0 8 2.84 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 P110533 1 8 29.66 200 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021082 1 8 N.A 300 N.A N.A     
Hydrant 1 H011677 1 8 N.A N.A N.A N.A 227,478.48 401,812.15 
f 
Pipe 1 P111434 0 8 2.56 300 
J-77 J-16 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P111773 0 8 4.73 300 DI 130 - - 
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Pipe 3 P110157 0 8 458.68 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P110127 1 8 0.32 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P111660 1 8 67.49 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P111383 0 8 5.54 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 P110287 0 8 1.29 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 P110842 0 8 0.36 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 P110294 0 8 0.87 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 10 P110505 0 8 81.18 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 11 P110511 0 8 0.45 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 12 P110965 0 8 5.94 100 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021326 0 8 N.A 200 N.A N.A 227,476.60 401,824.18 
Valve 2 V021451 1 8 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,363.81 402,254.97 
Valve 3 V021363 1 8 N.A 100 N.A N.A 227,358.36 402,258.98 
Valve 4 V021471 1 8 N.A 200 N.A N.A 227,319.58 402,330.14 
Hydrant 1 H011644 1 8 N.A N.A N.A N.A 227,365.19 402,252.81 
g 
Pipe 1 P111984 0 8 151.59 300 
J-16 J-51 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P111480 0 8 1.53 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P110845 0 8 23.62 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P111870 0 8 5.95 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P111447 0 8 1.30 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P112271 0 8 34.19 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 P111313 0 8 1.54 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 P110497 0 8 1.10 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 P110306 1 8 0.48 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 10 P111437 0 8 0.49 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 11 P112133 1 8 22.94 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 12 P110884 0 8 17.13 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 13 P111747 0 8 5.59 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 14 P110399 0 8 0.37 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 15 P006088 3 33 20.81 150 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 16 P006083 4 33 22.21 150 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021090 1 8 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,286.61 402,389.56 
Valve 2 V021275 1 8 N.A 200 N.A N.A 227,432.33 402,472.35 
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Valve 3 V021206 0 8 N.A 200 N.A N.A 227,462.01 402,490.32 
h 
Pipe 1 P112046 0 8 33.26 300 
J-16 J-96 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P110412 0 8 8.24 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P111386 0 8 140.44 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P112174 0 8 23.91 300 DI 130 - - 
i 
Pipe 1 P112288 1 8 1.22 300 
J-96 J-20 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P110698 0 8 0.15 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P112297 0 8 0.06 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P112292 1 8 12.51 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P110275 1 8 36.20 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 P110723 0 8 28.58 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 WM-334320 0 4 0.37 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 WM-334414 0 8 61.13 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 WM-334415 0 8 127.49 80 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 SV-74964 0 4 N.A 150 N.A N.A 227,337.64 402,645.31 
Valve 2 V021232 0 8 N.A 100 N.A N.A 227,392.02 402,674.80 
j 
Pipe 1 P111297 0 8 3.58 100 
J-20 J-53 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P112155 1 8 0.98 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P111338 1 8 0.39 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 P111014 0 8 1.39 100 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P111787 0 8 40.93 100 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021098 0 8 N.A 100 N.A N.A 227,414.93 402,690.40 
k 
Pipe 1 P111273 0 8 138.45 300 
J-20 J-115 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P110492 0 8 10.88 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 WM-130418 1 6 0.25 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 WM-131014 1 6 2.75 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 WM-131866 0 6 2.57 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 WM-132275 0 6 26.20 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 WM-130841 0 6 29.25 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 WM-145974 0 6 85.49 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 WM-146209 0 6 14.19 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 10 WM-146248 1 6 17.87 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 11 WM-146076 0 6 16.11 300 DI 130 - - 
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Pipe 12 WM-135277 0 6 0.44 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 13 WM-136231 0 6 0.91 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 14 WM-136695 0 6 26.91 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 15 WM-307986 0 6 1.74 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 16 WM-307399 0 4 0.54 300 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 SV-26338 0 6 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,648.38 402,838.84 
Valve 2 SV-22655 0 6 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,647.86 402,839.43 
Valve 3 SV-22919 0 6 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,689.71 402,843.88 
Valve 4 SV-67649 1 4 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,691.27 402,844.59 
Valve 5 A004254 0 7 N.A 80 N.A N.A 227,535.86 402,758.67 
Hydrant 1 HD-11487 1 6 N.A N.A N.A N.A 227,574.27 402,778.61 
Hydrant 2 HD-11613 1 6 N.A N.A N.A N.A 227,688.51 402,845.77 
l 
Pipe 1 P111067 1 8 229.40 300 
J-115 J-85 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P134882 0 8 21.17 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 WM-133554 0 6 83.22 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 4 WM-132738 0 6 29.29 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 WM-133604 0 6 0.73 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 6 WM-131022 1 6 2.97 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 7 WM-131109 0 6 0.71 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 8 WM-132898 0 6 0.58 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 9 WM-146222 0 6 11.66 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 10 WM-146135 0 6 23.20 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 11 WM-138892 0 6 2.44 150 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 12 WM-136696 0 6 0.43 150 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 13 WM-136561 0 6 23.04 150 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 SV-22654 0 6 N.A 150 N.A N.A 227,736.76 402,686.14 
Valve 2 SV-26983 0 6 N.A 150 N.A N.A 227,757.43 402,695.63 
Valve 3 SV-22653 0 6 N.A 200 N.A N.A 227,745.09 402,722.55 
Valve 4 AV-1050 0 6 N.A 150 N.A N.A 227,737.84 402,732.57 
Hydrant 1 HD-11610 0 6 N.A N.A N.A N.A 227,737.12 402,685.82 
m 
Pipe 1 P111991 1 8 7.31 300 
J-85 J-126 
DI 130 - - 
Pipe 2 P110244 1 8 4.81 300 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 3 P110072 0 8 1.16 300 DI 130 - - 
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Pipe 4 P112311 0 8 6.17 200 DI 130 - - 
Pipe 5 P110389 0 8 168.85 200 DI 130 - - 
Valve 1 V021198 0 8 N.A 200 N.A N.A 227,902.72 402,459.05 
Valve 2 V021190 1 8 N.A 300 N.A N.A 227,894.62 402,460.87 
Hydrant 1 H011668 1 8 N.A N.A N.A N.A 227,902.43 402,449.73 















N373 478317.062 4761255.5 240.70 
N374 478397.781 4761031.5 240.90 
N375 478681.906 4761138.5 240.35 
N4209 478305.25 4761244.5 240.70 
N4210 478318.375 4761256 240.70 
N4211 478438.438 4761294 241.50 
N5775 478520.531 4761489 241.90 
N5794 478795.125 4761303 240.80 
N5795 478753 4761413 241.50 
N5796 478576.312 4761346 241.50 
N5797 478574.531 4761345.5 241.50 
N5978 478677.812 4761137 240.35 
N5990 478617.406 4761234.5 240.90 
N5992 478615.75 4761239 240.90 
N6001 478320.562 4761250.5 240.70 
N6088 478835.219 4761196.5 243.60 
N6091 478657.625 4761129.5 239.70 
N6094 478274.75 4761109 240.40 
N6096 478361.938 4761142 239.70 
N6098 478402.969 4761033.5 240.90 
N6100 478313.938 4761001.5 240.90 
N6102 478248.469 4761099.5 239.47 
N6104 478212.375 4761209.5 239.80 
N6106 478180.062 4761073.5 238.80 
N6108 478175.219 4761086.5 238.80 
N6129 478192.938 4760956.5 238.60 
N6130 478219.562 4760966.5 238.60 
N6131 478101.812 4760923 238.90 
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N10326 481173.792 4754823.91 273.3 
N10327 481410.719 4754996.005 277.2 
N10333 481151.107 4754963.104 275.3 
N10334 481142.44 4754962.276 275.55 
N10412 481200.238 4754681.113 270.85 
N11569 480871.752 4754930.407 277.028 
N11570 480606.5 4754899 280.4 
N11593 480881.97 4754782.289 273.64 
N11594 480631.609 4754752.75 274.3 
N11595 480905.827 4754638.087 271.6 
N11596 480657.52 4754608.774 271.4 
N11638 480663.156 4754576.5 273.1 
N16836 481469.743 4754705.004 271.8 
N16837 481445.132 4754849.291 274.34 
N16839 481417.25 4754997.123 274.905 
N16841 481201.588 4754673.216 270.9 
N16842 480922.131 4754647.75 271.594 
N16844 480923.415 4754640.249 271.6 
N16845 481176.912 4754801.206 273.45 
N16846 481174.947 4754817.155 273.3 
N16847 480896.952 4754788.421 274 
N16848 480899.957 4754770.853 271.462 
N16849 480897.678 4754784.177 273.8 
N342 481348.031 4754984 274 
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J-101 228,252.29 401,476.08 7 
J-15 228,015.97 401,749.80 5 
J-18 227,957.10 401,712.29 7.5 
J-48 227,985.67 401,807.77 6 
J-88 227,605.43 401,587.33 14 
J-77 227,482.05 401,817.96 19 
J-16 227,286.30 402,389.02 18 
J-51 227,463.62 402,491.03 18 
J-96 227,182.94 402,562.88 17 
J-20 227,415.46 402,690.40 18 
J-53 227,392.75 402,730.63 17.5 
J-115 227,697.63 402,805.42 17 
J-85 227,895.30 402,460.19 12 
J-126 227,989.55 402,306.37 11 
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Figure B-5: South Phase Sub-Network Path Matrix for Node 11 
